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ABSTRACT 
CASTELLO, RYAN  An Economic Analysis of Somali Piracy Deterrence Strategies within the 
Context of the Economic Theory of Crime and Punishment. Department of Economics, March 
2012. 
Advisor: Professor Klein 
 
From 2006 to 2010, the number of reported piracy incidents perpetrated by Somali 
pirates, has increased from 19 to 212 per year, an alarming trend for the international shipping 
industry.  This paper examines the increasing number of pirate attacks within the context of the 
theory developed in, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach (Becker, 1968).  This 
paper demonstrates the supply of pirates is a function of probability of punishment, severity of 
penalty, as well as institutional factors.   
 This research entails a theoretical discussion, and an analysis of the available data on 
Somali piracy.  The theoretical discussion combines theory with current studies on piracy.  The 
data analysis examines the effect of deterrence strategies on the success of pirate attacks.  
 The data for the statistical analysis is primarily taken from The International Maritime 
Bureau annual piracy reports from 2006-2010.  One hundred attacks will be randomly selected 
from the total (600), and additional data collected from other published reports 
 The synthesis of Becker’s model and a statistical analysis of Somali piracy deterrence 
efforts offers a unique approach to studying the current dilemma.  This research includes a 
theoretical discussion and an empirical model that should provide some insight into which 
current strategies are effective against the increasing pirate threat.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Naval exploration and trade parallels the development of the modern world.  However, 
the criminal act of piracy also permeates the pages of naval history on which the foundation of 
the modern world is predicated.  History is filled with tales of woe, suffering and economic 
entrapment at the hands of pirates.  Yet, the naval powers of the world have traditionally been 
able to vanquish the threats posed by pirates.  
 Piracy falls within the bounds of criminal activity; however, it proposes a unique 
problem to governing forces.  While the vast majority of crime falls within a clear jurisdiction, 
piracy can occur in international waters which complicates the issue of authority and 
punishment.  Furthermore, crime, including piracy, disrupts the public order which is the 
foundation for economic growth within a society.  In today’s international community, piracy 
threatens free trade in particular by endangering ships traveling through the Gulf of Aden, Red 
Sea, Indian Ocean, and adjacent waters.  Piracy is an issue that must be addressed in order to 
promote global economic growth and security. 
  One of the most infamous groups of pirates in naval history, the Barbary Pirates, instilled 
fear into commercial vessels sailing through the sea-lanes of the Atlantic and Mediterranean.  
Following the Algiers-Portugal Peace Treaty of 1793, Portuguese naval patrols ceased operations 
near the Strait of Gibraltar.  Algiers, a benefactor of European tributes for the past century
1
, then 
                                                          
1
 Barbary Pirates, since the 17
th
 century, had been capturing commercial vessels in the Mediterranean.  They would 
seize cargo and enslave sailors.  As protection, European nations paid tributes to Algiers to prevent the interception 
of their ships.  The U.S. did not pay tribute to Algiers, for economic and doctrinal reasons (January 2009). 
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had access to the most utilized sea-lanes in the world, the Atlantic Ocean (January 2009).  
Utilizing brutal tactics, the Barbary Pirates targeted U.S. vessels, capturing eleven commercial 
ships and enslaving approximately one hundred sailors.  The solution of the U.S. in the late 
eighteenth century was to declare war on Algiers and the four other Barbary States, which 
included Tunis, Tripoli, Morocco, and Algiers.  The Barbary War officially escalated in 1803 
with the capture of the USS Philadelphia.  In response, President Jefferson sent a special 
coalition under the command of First Lieutenant Presley O’Bannon (USMC).  With of force of 
seven Marines and a group of Mamelukes, Lt. O’Bannon marched across North Africa and 
recaptured the USS Philadelphia at Derne.  Named the “Hero of Derne” Lt. O’Bannon’s triumph 
was indicative of the United States’ victory over the Barbary States (January 2009).  Although 
the United States was able to use unrestricted military force in order to eradicate the pirates of 
Northern Africa, the contextual environment that allows pirates to operate freely in the twenty 
first century does not lend itself to such a straight-forward solution. 
In the contemporary naval community, pirate attacks are still a real threat to economic 
security and freedom of the seas.  On February 22, 2011, Somali pirates killed four American 
hostages that had been hijacked while yachting through the pirate-infested waters of the Arabian 
Sea.  This act of brutality, theorized to be a reaction to the 2009 killing of three pirates by U.S. 
Navy SEALs during the rescue of American Richard Phillips, Captain of the MV Maersk 
Alabama, elucidates the current dangers of sailing through the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.  The 
risk of traversing through one of the most commercially utilized sea-lanes in the world extends to 
all naval vessels, predominantly commercial, due to the escalation of piracy in the Gulf of Aden 
and surrounding waters in the last fifteen years.  While the death of civilians strikes an alarming 
chord in the international community, it is uncommon for seafarers to be killed during pirate 
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attacks.  However, the economic toll taken on the global community as a consequence of 
unfettered pirate attacks on commercial vessels has become a cancer for the globalized economy. 
In the midst of U.S. economic sanctions imposed on Iran by President Obama; a trade embargo 
imposed by the European Union; Iran’s threats of closing the Strait of Hormuz to foreign trade; 
and “an economic war,” as coined by the economic minister of Iran, Shamseddin Hosseini, a 
transcendent threat continues to operate without impunity.   
According to correspondent, C.J. Chivers in a New York Times article on 06 January 
2012, during the first few days of 2012, a United States rescue carrier task force intercepted 13 
Iranian hostages from Somali pirates.  The Sunshine cargo ship, traveling from France to Iran, 
came under attack from six pirates armed with automatic rifles and rocket propelled grenades 
(RPGs).  The startled crew of the Sunshine armed their distress signal which was answered by 
the John C. Stennis, a U.S. aircraft carrier.  Luckily, the Stennis was only separated from the 
vulnerable Sunshine by a few miles.  Upon arrival, the pirates had abandoned their attempts at 
overtaking the ship as well as their weapons.  Immediately detained by the U.S. Navy, the pirates 
were subsequently released due to a lack of evidence after photographs and fingerprints were 
taken from of pirates.  However, during the time of the pirates’ detainment, the Navy used 
surveillance from a helicopter as well as radar to track the location of the pirates’ mother ship.  
U.S. Naval personnel tracked the pirates back to a fishing vessel, Al Mulahi, which was flying 
Iranian flags.  Having already received military threats from Iranian military officials, the Navy 
had to utilize extreme precaution in further investigation of the potential pirates.  During a 
suspicious radio interchange, an Iranian captive professed their situation in Urdu, a language 
foreign to his Somali captors.  With permission from the Pakistani commander of Combined 
Task Force 151, a navy team entered to Al Muhali to find the six Somalis, as well as nine 
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additional pirates.  Control of the ship was turned over to the U.S. Navy without resistance and 
the thirteen Iranian captives were liberated. 
The Al Muhali incident illustrates a number of problems the international authorities are 
having with deterring the actions of Somali pirates.  First, in this case by good fortune, the 
Stennis task force was in the vicinity of the distressed Sunshine.  In most cases, however, the 
vast expanse of sea in which the Somali pirates operate in prevents deterrence forces from 
quickly reacting to distress signals.  Second, the U.S. Navy was forced to release the potential 
pirates because the pirates tossed their weapons into the sea, there was insufficient evidence to 
detain the pirates.  In many cases this lack of evidence leads to the release of many pirates who 
are able to go scott-free.  Third, while the evidence was lost, the pirate boarding party admitted 
to being equipped with six AK-47s and an RPG with ten rockets, a devastating force for an 
unarmed commercial ship to encounter.  With greater success, Somali pirates are using the 
revenue to increase the depth of their armory and bolster their military force.  Lastly, the labor 
supply for pirates in Somalia is abundant due to the political and socioeconomic conditions of 
the failed state, and the subsequent reduction in employment.  For example, an offending pirate, 
Mr. Mahmoud, admitted he was aware of the consequences but he justified his offenses on his 
first pirate excursion by lamenting, “In Somalia we have no jobs.  That’s the reason to go to sea. 
Our country has a civil war, and I don’t have skills.”   
 The International Maritime Bureau reported that, during the first nine months of 2011, 
Somali pirates had increased the number of their operations from 126 through September in 2010 
to 199 through September of 2011.  The attacks perpetrated by Somali pirates accounted for 56% 
of all piracy incidents in 2011 (ICC 2011).  These record-breaking figures are the continuation of 
a pattern that has been occurring over the past decade.  As a result of the growing number of 
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incidents, the estimated cost of piracy to the international economy is approximately 3.238-
11.544 billion dollars a year (Bowden 2011).  The estimated cost of piracy is a combination of 
several factors.  Table 1 provides the upper bound and lower bound estimates for the total costs 
of piracy in 2010.     
Table 1: Estimate Annual Costs of Somali Piracy 
Sources: (Bowden 2011) and (Voytenko 2011) 
Estimated 
Costs 
(Millions 
USD) 
Ransom 
Costs 
Coalition 
Forces 
Prosecution 
Costs 
Insurance 
Premiums 
Commercial 
Vessel 
Security 
Equipment 
Cost to 
Local 
Economies 
Re-
Routing 
Anti-Piracy 
Organiztions 
Upper 
Bound 
238 2,000 31 3,200 2,500 1,250 2,300 25 
Lower 
Bound 
94 1,000 30 460 363 1,000 267 24 
 
The large range is due to variability in piracy data reported, limitations due to estimated costs, 
and inflated reported costs due to possible political biases.  The upper bound estimates are 
reported by the Chatham House organization, Oceans Beyond Piracy (Bowden 2011).  The upper 
bound estimates are criticized by Voytenko for overinflating estimated costs in order to 
exaggerate the problem.  In Voytenko, 2011, more conservative estimates are provided.  Due to 
the lack of undisputable reported evidence, it is assumed that the actual economic cost falls 
within the range from 3.238 to 11.544 billion USD in 2010.  This figure represents a legitimate 
impediment to the international economy.  Furthermore, not included within the economic costs 
is the suffering endured by the hostages that are taken into captivity by the Somali pirates.  
Piracy is a serious threat to all seafarers traveling through the chokepoints adjacent to the Somali 
Coast.     
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The world’s shipping industry constitutes ninety percent of all international commerce 
and estimated 8% of the world’s international trade travels through the Suez Canal (The 
Economist 2011) which connects directly to the pirate-infested waters which include The Gulf of 
Aden; The Red Sea; The Gulf of Guinea; The Strait of Malacca; The Indian subcontinent, 
particularly between India and Sri Lanka; and Central and South America (Bendall 2010).  
Figure 1: Major Shipping Lanes (IMB 2010)      Figure 2: 2010 Pirate Attacks (IMB 2010)  
 
As seen above in Figs. 1 and 2, the pirate attacks, occur not only in a large expanse of ocean, but 
are concentrated in several chokepoints on the major shipping lanes.  Due to the heavy sea-lane 
traffic and vulnerability of commercial vessels in several key locations, Somali pirates are 
afforded the ability to exploit the nautical danger zones and target indefensible vessels.  
Furthermore, in order to circumvent these vital sea-lanes and change shipping routes would force 
shipping companies to incur higher operating costs.   
The piracy problem is not limited to the vast expanse of ocean covered by the Somali 
Pirates.  The essence of the problem lies within the inability of international enforcement 
 
 
7 
 
agencies to deter the Somali population from engaging in acts of piracy.  This inability to 
prosecute is ultimately derived from the lack of institutional structure in the failed state of 
Somalia.  Therefore, one aim of this study is to examine different deterrence and punitive 
strategies, within the context of Becker’s Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach 
(1968).   
The economic theory suggests boundaries on the capabilities of enforcement agencies by 
noting the scarcity of resources that can be devoted to the capture and prosecution of criminals 
and thus determines the optimal value of resources to devote to anti-criminal activity.  This study 
will analyze how a variety of anti-piracy strategies utilize resources and, by using an analytical 
cost benefit analysis, determine their economic desirability.   
The rest of the research will be organized as follows: Chapter II reviews the institutional 
background of Somalia, including the root causes of the piracy dilemma.  The discussion of the 
development of the piracy phenomenon in Somalia and countermeasures includes the failed 
state, fishing piracy, current anti-piracy measures undertaken by international militaries, and the 
best management strategies of commercial vessels.  Chapter III discusses the economics of 
piracy and the application of Gary Becker’s economic theory of crime, with subsequent 
economic extension to piracy.  The discussion of Becker’s theory includes a discussion of 
optimality conditions and behavioral responses to the variables presented in the theoretical 
model.  Chapter IV describes the variables of the model, in the context of Becker’s theory, and 
presents the results of the statistical analysis; Chapter V gives the conclusion and suggests areas 
that deserve further study in the field of piracy and its economic causes and consequences.   
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CHAPTER II 
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND CURRENT DETERRENCE STRATEGIES 
 The Somali piracy trend, currently taking place off of the coast of the Horn of Africa, is a 
result of several institutional failures by the Somali government.  Somalia has ranked number 
one in the Foreign Policy’s Failed States Index from 2008-2011.  The central government has 
little control over its population, and the factionalized country is oppressed by poverty and an 
ongoing civil war.  Since creation of the Somali independent state in 1960, fractionalization and 
territory disputes with neighboring countries have created an internal turmoil that has destroyed 
the Somali state.  Somalia’s history of militant dictatorships, civil war, fractionalization, and the 
absence of a central governing body   has led to an anarchical state that has bred a budding pirate 
population.  Without the threat of a Somali police force, the Somali pirates have been able to 
carry out attacks on commercial vessels with little fear of authorities and in some cases with 
impunity.   
 Given the geographic chokepoint created by the Horn of Africa and Somalia’s proximity 
to the Gulf of Aden combined with the lack of Somalia’s policing of pirate activity, the number 
of pirate attacks has increased dramatically over the past ten years.  The burden of piracy defense 
has fallen on the international community as well as the owners of the commercial vessels that 
are constantly at risk when traveling through the Red Sea and adjoining sea-lanes.  With ransom 
costs ranging from 3-5 million dollars combined with insurance costs and opportunity costs 
rising in reaction to the increasing transportation costs, an increasing importance has been placed 
on finding ways to circumnavigate or eradicate the piracy problem.  Although, in recent years 
coalition navies and maritime anti-piracy agencies have had success in deterring pirates through 
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developing anti-piracy activities, the question still remains as to what strategies are most 
effective and who is responsible for financing these anti-piracy activities.  Furthermore, while 
demand for short term solutions requires complex and often difficult international cooperation, 
establishing a long term solution necessitates fixing the Somali failed state and establishing an 
effective central government.  
 
2.1 The History of the Failed Somali State 
 The inability of the Transitional Federal Government (TGF) to exert any control over the 
separate clan regions in Somalia has led to indisputable poverty and deprived living conditions 
for almost the entire Somali population.  In the 2011 Human Development Index (HDI) Report, 
Somalia was not able to be ranked due to lack of data.  However, it appeared under the section 
labeled “Other Countries or Territories.”  The scarce data that is available gives insight into the 
abject conditions in which the Somali people live.  Life expectancy in Somalia is 51.2 years, 
which is 7.5 years less than the average for low HDI nations and 18.6 years lower than the world 
average.  More indicative of the quality of life endured by those in Somalia is the inequality 
adjusted life expectancy which is .260 in Somalia versus the world average of .637
2
.   
 The quality of life is not the only indicator that the institutional mechanisms, which 
generally support the people of a nation, have failed.  The expected years of schooling for Somali 
children is 2.4 years and the literacy rate is 37.8%.  In addition, 56.5 % of females and 84.7% of 
                                                          
2
 Inequality adjusted life expectancy is calculated with consideration to the life expectancy index, education index, 
and the income index. 
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males are active members of the labor force
3
.  Yet, 65.6% of the population is considered to be 
living in severely impoverished conditions.  Added to the reality of working conditions and wage 
pittances desperately desired by the population, the median age in the country is 17.5 years with 
a dependency ratio of 91.2%
4
.  With the majority of the population unable to provide for 
themselves and relying solely on the miniscule wages of a teenage working force crime seems 
like an inevitable reality.  Furthermore, 37.9% of the population lives in an urban environment, 
and it is from these impoverished regions where the recruitment of pirates is flourishing (HDI 
2011).    In order to understand Somalia’s qualification as a failed state, it is necessary to 
understand how the development of the country led to its current deprived state of existence.   
 Somalia, also commonly referred to as The Horn of Africa, harbors a population of 
approximately 9.9 million people.  The mostly nomadic and pastoral population has cultural 
identity derived from both Cushitic and Arab descent.  While the Cushitic people have 
archaeological ties to The Horn of Africa from around 100 CE, the first traces of development 
are believed to be from Arab-Koreishite colonists from Yemen in the seventh century CE.  The 
modern era for Somalia did not begin until the 19
th
 century when European powers utilized the 
nation’s crucial trading location for harbor amenities.  The largest power within the Somali 
border was the British East India Company who gained control over the northern portion of 
Somalia in 1886 in exchange for protection guarantees.  The British sovereignty was challenged 
by a rebellious faction, under the command of Mohamed Abdullah in the early 1920s.  Despite 
his defeat, at the hands of the British, Mohamed Abdullah was deemed a national hero by the 
Somali people (U.S. Department of State 2011).   
                                                          
3
 Labor Force Participation rate is the sum of all working age individuals actively searching for work or working in 
the labor force divided by the total number of individuals in the nation of working age. 
4
 The dependency ratio is calculated by dividing the total number of people ages (0-14) and (65+) from the 
population of people ages (15-64). 
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During the eleven years from 1897-1908, Italian government assumed direct control over 
the southeast territory of the fledgling nation.  The Italian government’s colonial territory 
continued to expand westward and north until, in 1940 with the onset of World War II, the 
Italians and British engaged in unrestricted warfare.   In 1941, British operations focused on 
overtaking the Italian East African Empire which again brought the majority of Somalia under 
British control.  Under British control, the transition towards autonomy began.  In 1948, Italy 
relinquished all claims on territory in Somalia, and on June 26, 1960 British Somalia gained 
independence
5
.  Initial democratic attempts at constitutional governance failed in 1969 when a 
coup placed Major General Mohamed Said Barre the Somali president.  Under Barre, the 
government took the form of a twenty member Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC).  The 
SRC attempted to govern using the Soviet model, and in doing so they centralized control over 
information, used the military to redistribute fertile farmlands, as well as engaging in a reign of 
terror over the Somali population (CIA Factbook 2011).   
As the military led government became increasingly radical, Somali relations deteriorated 
with their neighbors.  In the 1970s, the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) began to attack 
the eastern region of Ethiopia using guerilla tactics.  From 1975-1977, Somalia invaded Ethiopia 
twice.  This spawned the Ogaden War (1977-1978) that resulted in the defeat of Somlia due to 
the aid afforded to Ethiopia from Cuba.  Following the defeat, Somalia renounced its ties with 
the Soviet Union.  In doing so, they gained the international support from the United States 
(1982-1988).  Despite U.S. aid, the situation in Somalia continued to deteriorate.  Barre’s regime 
became increasingly violent in suppressing opposition movements.  This led to the Somali Civil 
War.  Several different movements formed in opposition to the military dictatorship including 
                                                          
5
 On July 1, 1960, Italian Somaliland joined the recently independent nation to form the Republic of Somalia. 
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the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), the Somali National Movement (SNM), the 
United Somali Congress (USC), and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) (U.S. Department of 
State 2011).   
The Somali economy was in complete turmoil.  The national treasury was depleted due to 
military efforts to protect the established government.  The population of the war-torn country 
began to claim refugee status and flee to bordering Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya.  In 1991, the 
central government was driven out of power by USC and SNM forces took control of 
Mogadishu, the last stronghold of the Barre government.  The U.S. and the U.N. provided aid for 
the distraught Somali populations in several humanitarian operations; however, by 1994 all U.S. 
forces were withdrawn from Somalia.   
Table 2: Major Government Changes in Somali History (U.S. State Department 2012) 
Date Controlling 
Government 
Cause for Change 
600-1600  Arab Sultanate Koreishite immigrants from Yemen 
1600-1800 Sultan of Oman 
and Zanzibar 
Took control of coastal towns 
1840-1885 United Kingdom East India Company gains unrestricted harbor facilities 
1886-1920 United Kingdom U.K. gains control over Northern Somalia through treaties 
with ruling chiefs 
1885-1940 Italy Italy gains commercial advantages (1885); In 1908 Italian 
Somliland is established and colonial status is granted; In 
1936 Italy annexes Ethiopia 
1941-1960 United Kingdom- 
Military 
administration  
Britain defeats Italian forces in eastern Africa during the 
onset of WWII 
1960-1969 Somali Republic Somali Republic is formed through the UN General 
Assembly (1959); Italy relinquishes control over Somaliland  
1969-1991 Gen. Said Barre; 
SRC 
Military coup overthrows constitutional democracy and 
Gen. Said Barre assumes position as President 
1991-Present TFG Absence of effective government; failed state 
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The collapse of the central government created a void of central authority within Somalia.  
Despite 14 reconciliation conferences and a mandate by the Organization of African Unity and 
the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), no true central government was 
established until 2000.  The Transitional Federal Government (TFG  ) was established in 2000 
but has had little support in unifying the alienated factions.   
The current state of Somalia is that of complete chaos.  The TGF is unable to exert any 
control over the various factions that are contesting for autonomy or control.  Furthermore, the 
terrorist organization, al-Shabaab, controls the south central region of Somalia.  In the spring of 
2011, Somalia experienced the worst drought in last half of a century leaving an already 
desperate population in complete destitution.  Substantial crop failure and increased food prices 
have led the U.N. to declare a state of famine in Somalia.  Measures have been undertaken by 
international humanitarian agencies in order to help the estimated 4 million starving and 750,000 
dying Somalis; however, many of these ships face the risk of being attacked by pirates (CIA 
Factbook 2011). 
The war-torn population has had to develop ways in which to survive during the current 
crises.  With few jobs available many Somalis have migrated to bordering countries; however, a 
rising portion of the population has entered into the criminal labor market.  Many of these 
criminals have joined the ranks of the pirates. 
 
2.2 Fishing Piracy 
The two fundamental causes of the current piracy problem in the waters off of the Somali 
Coast are both derivatives of the failed Somali state.  However, while the failure Somali 
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institutional framework and tribal rifts are resultant of the internal struggles of the war-torn state, 
another international crisis exists.  Since the dissolution of General Said Barre’s military 
dictatorship in 1991, Somalia’s coast has been invaded by illegal foreign fishing.  Illegal, 
Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing is an epidemic that affects all of the world’s seas.  In 
2006, the High Seas Task Force reported that IUU practices are valued at approximately 4 to 9 
billion USD per year.  Of the total amount of revenue from IUU vessels, only 1.25 billion dollars 
were reported to have been taken from international waters.  Therefore, the majority of the focus 
of IUU fishing is localized to Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) and sovereign waters.  
Furthermore, nations that have weak enforcement, generally as a result of poor institutional 
infrastructure, are frequently exploited by IUU vessels (HSTF 2006).  After the Somali droughts 
of 1974 and 1986 caused thousands of Somali farmers to migrate to the coast in order to pursue 
lives in fishing communities.  The arrival and prominence of the fishing pirates after 1991 
threatened the livelihood of the Somali fishermen and caused significant damage to the 
ecosystem as a result of illegal fishing processes and the illegal dumping of hazardous waste 
(Waldo 2009).  As a result of the competition between the incumbent fishermen and the foreign 
intruders
6
, an evolution of weapon systems occurred, and the pirates of today are the resultant 
legacy of these early Somali fishermen.  This section discusses how the illegal foreign fishing 
pirates exploitative practices played an often overlooked role in the development of the current 
piracy epidemic.   
 After the collapse of the military regime of Said Barre in 1991, both Somalia’s Navy and 
Coastguard were disbanded.  This resulted in the coastal waters of Somalia to be unregulated and 
                                                          
6
 Waldo (2009) distinguishes between two different kinds of pirates: fishing pirates and shipping pirates.  Fishing 
piracy refers to the actions perpetrated by the IUU vessels.  Shipping piracy refers to the hijackings and attacks on 
merchant vessels traveling through the waters near Somalia. 
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primed for exploitation by foreign interest.  In 1991 the UN, Russia, and Spain carried out 
surveys that revealed the seas East of Somalia could potentially yield over 200,000 tons of fish 
per year for industrial fishing.  While the industrial fishers could gather significantly large 
catches, estimated to catch approximately $450 million worth of fish from Somali sovereign 
waters, they are harmful to the indigenous ecosystem; and more significant, the foreign industrial 
fishing market poses direct competition to the local artisanal fishers
7
.  In search of the profitable 
fish species
8
 that reside off the Somali coast, the illegal foreign fishing vessels engaged in illegal 
fishing strategies. These methods included the utilization of enormous drift nets as well as 
explosives, which are both illegal and harmful to the ecosystem. 
 Immediately the relationship between the fishing pirates, as deemed by (Waldo 2009), 
and the Somali fishermen became volatile and combative.  The incumbent fishing community 
was interested in sustaining their right to fish the waters of their homeland in order to provide 
their families with the primary dietary source of protein for their families.  Meanwhile, the 
presence of the Somali fishermen meant competition for the fishing pirates, and due to the 
contrasting missions, the relationship between the two groups turned hostile.  Early in 1992, 
shortly after the arrival of the illegal foreign fishermen, there are reports of attacks on Somali 
vessels which include pouring boiling water on the decks of Somali ships, cutting fishing nets, 
and ramming opponent ships.  In anecdotally documented cases, these attacks led to the 
destruction of Somali ships and the deaths of crewmembers.  In reaction to the threatening 
invaders, Somali fishermen began to arm themselves with simple weapons.  However, the 
                                                          
7
 Artisanal fishing is considered small scale fishing which depends on traditional methods and basic technology, and 
usually indicates a low socioeconomic level.  These methods and tools include hooks, nets, harpoons, as well as 
other methods.  Artisanal fishers are able to catch fish close to shore due to the simple technology.  Most incumbent 
Somali fishing villages have traditionally relied on artisanal fishing. (World Fisheries Trust 2008) 
8
 Somali local valuable fish and crustacean species include tuna, shark, pelagic fish, lobster, and deep-sea water 
shrimp (HSTF, 2006) 
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foreign fishing vessels had more capital and were able to afford more sophisticated weapon 
systems as well as larger and faster ships.  This left the Somali fishermen vulnerable to attack 
from the foreign vessels.   
Over time, the local fishermen accumulated more sophisticated weapons until they posed 
a threatening force.  This cyclical trend evolved from its inception in 1991, with the arrival of the 
IUUs, into the piracy epidemic that now plagues all ships traveling through the waters of the Red 
Sea, Aden Ocean, Somali Coast, and Arabian Sea (Waldo 2009).  While the ultimate goal of the 
vast majority of Somali pirates are financial gains, there are still some shipping pirates that 
consider themselves the last line of defense for local Somali fishermen that have been exploited 
by foreign invaders for over two decades.  In a 20 September 2008 New York Times satellite 
phone interview with Jeffrey Gettleman and a pirate hijacker, Sugule Ali, that had just taken 
control of the Ukrainian freighter, Faina, Sugule Ali claimed that the reasoning behind their 
piracy was, “to stop illegal fishing and dumping in our waters.”  He continued to assert that, “We 
don’t consider ourselves sea bandits.  We consider sea bandits those who illegally fish in our 
seas and dump waste in our seas and carry weapons in our seas.  We are simply patrolling our 
seas.  Think of us like a coast guard.”  The testimonial from the pirate reveals that the animosity 
between the Somalis and IUUs is still prevalent in the minds of the affected Somalis.  Despite 
Sugule Ali’s self appointment as a crusader against foreign fishermen, he and his team of pirates 
were asking for $20 million in cash.  Once concerned with protecting their rights to fish the 
sovereign waters of Somalia in order to provide for their family, the former fishermen have now 
armed themselves with RPGs and semi-automatic weapons.  The Somali pirates transformed 
themselves from victims into the notorious pirates of the modern day world. 
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Despite the detrimental damage caused by IUUs to the coastal population of Somalia, as 
well as the oceanic ecosystem, there has been little international attention paid to the fishing 
piracy.  In 2008, the UN Security Council passed two resolutions (Resolution 1816 and 
Resolution 1834) which pertain to the Somali piracy situation.  Somali officials unsuccessfully 
petitioned these resolutions to address extortion and exploitation of the Somali coast by IUUs.  
The absence of IUU recognition in the UN resolutions is indicative of the international treatment 
of the fishing piracy.  The UN Security council Resolution 1816 (2008) “condemns and deplores 
all acts of piracy and armed robbery.” The resolution galvanizes, “States interested in the use of 
commercial maritime routes off the coast of Somalia, to increase and coordinate their efforts to 
deter acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea in coordination with the TFG.”  The document 
considers the Somalia Transitional Federal Government’s inability to sufficiently police and 
prosecute pirates.  However, absent from the document is any mention of the exploitation of the 
TFG’s inept maritime authority by foreign vessels.  To the same regard, Resolution 1838 fails in 
the same regard as Resolution 1816 to acknowledge the illegal fishing and hazardous waste 
dumping in Somali waters. 
The long run solution to combating Somali piracy must include a concerted effort to 
prosecute IUUs.   In addition to developing a Somali central government and building self-
sustaining infrastructure, the international community must recognize and act in response to the 
illegal fishing trend.  Preventing foreign commercial fishermen from continuing their 
exploitation of the Somali coast may allow a reemergence of Somali fishermen to provide 
comfortably for their families.  There is no evidence suggesting that irreparable damage has been 
done to the Somali coast; however, many Somalis that are reliant upon fishing as a means for 
income are still being ignored and dejected.  If the IUU trend continues, more Somali fishermen 
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may turn to piracy as a means for survival.  In a country where agriculture and fishing are the 
two largest sources of income, a combination of drought and IUUs have devastated an already 
war torn nation.  Fishing and agriculture account for approximately 40% of GDP and 71% of the 
labor force (CIA Factbook 2011).  Therefore, it can be understood that failures in either the 
agriculture or fishing sectors has detrimental effects on the population of Somalia.  In order to 
prevent the continuation of the illegal fishing piracy, the Somali government must establish a 
capable coast guard.  The re-establishment of a Somali military force will be able to deter both 
fishing piracy and commercial shipping piracy.  This will necessitate international funding and 
training; however, a sovereign Somali police force could save the international community 
money in the long run in realized decreases in commercial shipping through Somali waters.   
Illegal fishing should be understood as both a root cause for Somali piracy as well as an 
avenue of approach to decrease Somali piracy, in the long run, by providing additional legal 
forms of employment.  In terms of Becker’s theory, illegal fishing decreases the expected 
revenue of legal employment.  Somali fishermen are impeded in their attempts at providing food 
for their families; thus, they may seek other employment if they unable to make a living through 
legal means.  In a country with a very low education threshold, job opportunities are limited.  
The availability of jobs affects the institutional variable in Becker’s theory.  If there are fewer 
jobs available, the number of offenses will increase in reaction to the limitations on the legal 
labor market. 
Initial steps have been taken by the international community in combating IUUs.  The 
operational plan for EU NAVFOR ATALANTA contains a mandate to monitor illegal fishing 
off the coast of Somalia.  This means that in addition to the EU’s effort to safeguard WFP ships, 
they also plan to investigate suspicious fishing vessels from foreign nations.  Although the EU 
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warships are being multi-purposed and not dedicated solely to monitoring fishing, it is a positive 
step for Somali fishermen.  Furthermore, the Somalia Joint Strategy 2008-2013 notes the 
destructive effects of IUUs and pledges to allocate resources towards the protection and 
regulation of fishing in Somali waters.  The EU recognition is the first endorsement of solving 
the problem. 
 
2.3 Development of Somali Piracy in the Last Five Years 
 The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) maintains a database of information on pirate 
attacks throughout the world.  The number of pirate attacks attributed to Somali pirates 
constitutes the largest percentage of pirate attacks, 49.2% of all attacks in 2010.  In addition, the 
pirate actions attributed to Somali pirates has been growing at an alarming rate.  Before Somali 
piracy became an international issue, piracy still plagued shipping.  Prior to the rapid growth of 
Somali piracy, The Malacca Strait experienced significant threats from pirates.  The Malacca 
Strait is a vital shipping lane in between Indonesia and the Malaysian peninsula.  The Malacca 
Strait experienced a significant decline in piracy as a result of naval military patrols from 
Malyasian, Indonesian, and Singaporean navies.  The number of pirate attacks decreased from 
215 in 2000 to 94 in 2005 (IMB 2005, 5).  During this same time, the Indian Ocean experienced 
a similar pattern of quick increase and sharp decline in the number of pirate attacks.  While the 
number of pirate attacks is on the decline in the Malacca Strait, the number of attacks is 
dramatically increasing in Somalia.   Table 1 uses data from the 2010 IMB piracy report which 
illustrates the rapid development of Somali pirate activity from 2006-2010. 
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Table 3: Number and percentage of Somali Pirate Attacks (IMB 2006-2010) 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Gulf of Aden 10 13 92 117 53 
Arabian Sea 2 4 0 1 2 
Oman 0 0 1 0 0 
Red Sea 0 0 0 15 25 
Somalia 10 31 19 80 139 
World Total 239 263 293 410 445 
Somali attacks 
as a percentage 
of the world 
total 
9.2 18.3 38.2 52.0 49.2 
 
Several patterns can be observed within the data.  First, there is a clear increasing pattern of the 
number of Somali pirate attacks, and from 2007-2008 there is a dramatic increase in the number 
of attacks.  The increasing pattern seems to be isolated within the Somali region.  During the five 
year span, the number of Somali incidents as a percentage of the number of attacks in the world 
increases parallel to the number of Somali pirate attacks.  This suggests that piracy in the rest of 
the world has remained constant while there has been a shock to the number of Somali pirates 
during the last five years.   
Secondly, the attacks are not spread out evenly over the entire pirate area of operations 
nor are they completely consistent over time.  This can be the result of two different factors.  As 
the scope of pirates operations increases and they become more profitable, the pirate equipment 
also becomes more sophisticated.  This spread of pirate activity to other, further, seas suggests 
the use of mother ships and more technologically advanced vessels.  Also, the staggering 
concentrations of pirate attacks over time may suggest the effectiveness of deterrence strategies.  
For example, there may have been an anti-piracy strategy adopted by international military 
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forces or private vessels in the Gulf of Aden which could explain the transference of activity to 
the coast of Somalia and the Red Sea. 
Lastly, the consistency of the number of pirate attacks in the rest of the world, while 
Somali piracy has spiked upwards, may suggest success of pirate deterrence or control strategies 
in the rest of the world.  If these actions have had success in limiting the growth of pirates, it may 
be possible to mimic the strategies adopted by these enforcement agencies and apply them to the 
Somali crisis. 
The increase in the number of piracy operations as well as the sophistication and the 
range of the Somali pirates has added to the economic costs incurred by the international 
shipping community.  As the pirates increase the number of successful attacks, their profits 
swell.  A portion of those profits are directly invested in more technologically advanced 
weapons.  Now armed with semi-automatic weapons, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and 
more powerful ships used as mother-ships, the Somali pirates pose a significant mortal danger to 
all seafaring vessels in the region.  Although current trends suggest the aim of the pirates is 
primarily financial, the threat of deadly force still exists.  Without an effective police force and 
due to the absence of proper prosecution capabilities, the Somali pirates are able to flourish with 
little risk of being punished.  Without punishment, there is no disincentive to join the labor 
supply of the pirate market. 
2.4 The consequences of piracy to the Somali economy 
 As demonstrated by the previous section, Somali piracy is a fast growing occupation for 
the disenfranchised youths of Somalia.  In Chapter III, an in depth discussion of the Becker’s 
economic theory reveals that criminals, like pirates, operate with the expectation of a monetary 
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return to crime greater than that which they could alternatively earn in a legal labor market. 
Estimates claim that Somali pirates generated approximately $70 million in revenue from ransom 
payments in 2009.  Compared to Somalia’s revenue from gross cattle exports ($40 million) and 
the government budget for Puntland ($17.6 million), piracy offers a very lucrative venture for a 
desperate population (Shortland 2012).  The large amounts of money paid to Somali pirates for 
the safe return of crews and vessels impose large economic repercussions to the shipping 
industry.  In addition, the increased costs of security, insurance, and damage done to ships create 
an international impediment to globalization.  According to Becker’s theory, the revenue gain 
from a criminal act offsets the fiscal loss of the victimized person or organization; however, 
crime generally caries high externalities that cause net losses to society.  Therefore, while the net 
social loss accrued as a result of piracy is clearly recognized in ransom payments, hostage 
suffrage, and other negative externalities, the flow of ransom money must also be analyzed to 
determine the social gain by pirates in order to properly determine net social loss. 
 While measuring social losses from piracy is relatively simple, tracking the flow of 
money following a ransom payment is a much more complicated and speculatory process.  Due 
to the political instability of Somalia, measuring economic development in known pirate towns is 
a difficult endeavor.  Therefore, alternative means for determining economic development must 
be relied upon.   
Shortland (2012) relies upon satellite imagery of night-time light emissions and high 
resolution satellite images in order to indicate locations of unequal economic growth.  The 
measurement of night-time light emissions indicates increased usage of electricity; light 
emissions are generally a reliable marker of economic growth.  Since 2007, she claims that there 
has been a general decrease in light emissions, excluding Bosasso and Garowe which have pirate 
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affiliations.  From the high resolution images, Shortland was able to recognize possibly telling 
changes in Hobyo, a coastal Somali town, and Garowe, the capital of Puntland.  Hobyo, starting 
in 2005, started to show signs of development of high-end communications equipment and 
fortified structures.  Garowe, which is known to have strong pirate ties, has doubled in size 
during the time period 2002-2009.  This economic growth has had an alarming rate of increases 
in luxury goods, such as new cars and expensive houses (Shortland 2012).  These changes are 
inconsistent with the general Somali population who lives on the fringe of absolute poverty.                
 There is a large concern that ransom from piracy is being laundered into other countries 
for other illegal activity, such as terrorism, the evidence provided by satellite imagery 
demonstrates that at least some portion of the revenue is staying within the borders of Somalia.  
However, the money is not being used to stimulate Somali economic growth; rather, ransom 
money funds increased weaponry and technology for pirates as well as providing luxuries to the 
beneficiaries of piracy.  Beneficiaries most likely include clan hierarchies and active pirate 
members.  This has created the unfortunate situation in which the pirates benefit tremendously 
from ransom payments while the poor public suffers by an increased wage gap and increasing 
food prices (Shortland 2012).  Therefore, the net social loss extends further than the international 
commercial shipping industry.  The devastated Somali population is also suffering from the 
economic exploits of the organized pirate industry.   
 
2.5 Current Deterrence and Anti-Piracy Strategies 
 Anti-piracy strategies range from military intervention to re-routing naval routes around 
Arica, in order to avoid the risk of pirates in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.  The official U.S. 
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National Maritime Security Strategy, regarding Somali pirates, put in place in 2005 states, 
“safety and economic security of the United States depends upon the secure use of the world’s 
oceans.”  The statement asserted that the international threat to maritime security posed by 
pirates will not be tolerated by the United States.  The Bush Administration certified the Policy 
for the Repression of Piracy and other Criminal Acts of Violence at Sea in 2007, which declared 
that the United States would, “continue to lead and support international efforts to repress piracy 
and other acts of violence against maritime navigation.”  In 2008, the U.S. developed a plan 
developed to combat piracy threats around the Horn of Africa.  “The Countering Piracy off the 
Horn of Africa: Partnership and Action Plan” (henceforth the Action Plan) outlined the U.S. 
policy for dealing with Piracy in three parts. One, prevent attacks by making the sea-lanes less 
vulnerable to piracy.  Two, in accordance with international maritime laws, disrupt all pirate 
activity. Three, prosecute all parties guilty of violations of international maritime laws.  This 
strategic goals established by the 2007 and 2008 called for large-scale military intervention on 
the part of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps.  However, allocation of military resources, in 2007 
and 2008, was difficult due to the two-war front maintained by the United States during this 
time.   
 In 2009, the Obama Administration revoked the strategic military interventionist 
approach and replaced it with a nation-building strategy.  The Obama Administration focused on 
building the TFG into a formidable government capable of asserting control over the Somali 
nation.  This support plan included direct financial aid as well as the implementation of security 
advisors in Puntland and Somaliland with the directive of persuading officials to police piracy.  
In addition to military action, the 2008 Action Plan proposed direct support and establishment of 
a trust fund that supports the prosecution of pirates.  The judicial support of Kenya was 
 
 
25 
 
welcomed by the Obama Administration; however, in 2010, the effectiveness of the injection of 
U.S. finance into the Kenyan judicial infrastructure was uncertain (Congressional Research 
Service 2011). 
2.5.A. Military Deterrence 
 In a study conducted by Oceans Beyond Piracy in 2010, reported that approximately two 
billion dollars per year is spent by militaries around the world to combat piracy (Oceans Beyond 
Piracy 2010).  The primary method of military and naval deterrence has taken the form of 
security patrols and acting in the capacity as a reaction force. The U.S. Navy, operating under 
strategies developed in the 2008 Action Plan, is part of an international coalition against piracy 
around the Horn of Africa.  The United States is currently engaged in Operation Ocean Shield 
and Combined Task Force 151.  In addition to the two military operations conducted by the 
United States, the European Union (EU) established operation EU NAVFOR ATALANTA.  The 
operational plan sets forth three goals for the pirate-infested region.  One, protect ships carry 
cargo from the World Food Program (WFP) that are supplying the decimated populations of 
Eastern Africa.  Two, offer safe passage to vulnerable commercial vessels traversing through the 
dangerous waters.  Three, terminate all pirate activities taking place off of the coast of Somalia 
(Percy and Shortland 2009).  The policies asserted by the EU legislation are very much parallel 
to those issued in the U.S. 2008 Action Plan.   
However, all of the navies operating in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Arabian Ocean 
face the same problems in completing the goals outlined in the two documents.  First, due to the 
expansion and increased sophistication of pirate operations and technology, the pirate scope of 
operations has increased to include a vast expansion of ocean.  Also, pirates have learned to 
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hijack vessels and return to within 200 miles of the Somali coast, which protects them under 
Somali sovereignty which is unable to provide proper security of its shores.  In order for 
international protection forces to stop these attacks, they have to be on the scene almost 
immediately; otherwise the timeframe for action expires, leaving military forces impotent.  
Secondly, naval militaries are reluctant to act due to the risk incurred by the hostages.  In 2010, 
there were a total of 1,180 hostages taken by pirates, 86% of which were taken by Somali pirates 
(IMB 2010).  Of those 1,180 hostages, only eight were killed in 2010.  This is strong evidence 
that suggests that the pirates are solely interested in financial gains.  However, if a doctrine of 
direct military engagement with pirates was adopted, it can be inferred that the number of 
hostages killed would increase dramatically.  In order to protect hostages, international navies 
focus on the deterrence and preventions of piracy (Percy and Shortland 2009).   
The three major operations launched in reaction to the Piracy threat are EU NAVFOR 
ATALANTA, Operation Ocean Shield, and CTF 151.  The first, Operation ATALANTA, began 
in December 2008 and has expanded operations until December 2012.  The mission objectives 
for the EU operation include protecting WFP vessels, deterring Somali piracy, protecting 
commercial vessels, and monitoring fishing activities off of the coast of Somalia.  
The operation is a cooperative effort made by all EU countries and additional countries, 
including Norway, Croatia, Ukraine, and Montenegro.  The participating nations provide naval 
vessels, patrol aircraft, vessel protection detachment (VPD) teams, in addition to financial 
contributions.  The Operational Commander is Rear Admiral Duncan L. Potts (UK), supported 
by the Deputy Operation Commander Rear Admiral Rainer Endres (Germany), and Force 
Commander Rear Admiral Jorge Manso (Spain).  The 8.4 million Euros and 8.05 million Euros 
that financed the operation in 2010 and 2011 respectively were split up among EU countries 
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based on GDP.  The headquarters of the operation is based in Northwood, United Kingdom.  The 
combined forces amount to 1,500 military personnel and a range of five to ten surface warfare 
vessels in the area of operations (AO)
9
 dedicated to the deterrence of pirate activities in Somali 
waters.  The military strategy used by the EU naval forces is dynamic and is based around the 
changing tactics adopted by the pirates (EU NAVFOR Somalia 2011). 
Since the inception of the operation in 2008, the EU claims that they have had a 100% 
success rate in protecting WFP vessels
10
 as well as the detainment of 111 suspected pirates, of 
which 56 have been convicted at the time of the publication of the paper.  In addition to the naval 
campaign against pirates, the EU operation allocates funds to the training of a Somali security 
force.  In May 2010, training began in Uganda.  Furthermore, the EU has supported the African 
Union’s military mission to Somalia (AMISOM) with approximately 9,000 military personnel in 
Africa as well as 258 million Euros in monetary support to the African Peace Facility.  The EU 
has also supported the long run effort to build Somali infrastructure by committing large amounts 
of funds to governance and security (52 million), education (36 million), and economic growth 
(48 million) (EU NAVFOR Somalia 2011).  
In addition to the EU NAVFOR coalition warships operating in the Gulf of Aden and 
Indian Ocean, Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151) has been actively conducting pirate 
deterrent operations since January 8, 2009.  One of three task forces under the command of the 
Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), CTF 151 is charged with the mission of deterring pirate 
attacks through patrols, search and seizure missions, and quick response capabilities.  CTF 151 
was initialized in order to allow CTF 150 to focus on its primary goals of general terror 
                                                          
9
 The AO for EU NAVFOR ATALANTA is 2 million square nautical miles. 
10
 WFP vessels have amounted to the delivery of 674,000 tons of food to Somalia. 
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deterrence, which entails prevention of drug and weapon smuggling into Iraq and Afghanistan.  
CTF 151 is tasked with patrolling 1.1 million square miles of ocean.  Under the command of 
Vice Admiral Mark Fox (USN), commander of US Fifth Fleet, CTF 151 includes 25 nations 
providing ships, assets, and personnel.  Currently commanded by CDRE Abdul Aleem 
(Pakistan), the command is rotated every 4-6 months.  Since the start of operations in 2009, CTF 
151 has maintained a naval force of approximately 30-40 naval vessels (CMF 2009).  While the 
EU NAVFOR coalition ships provide the majority of the escorts for WFP ships, CTF 151 carries 
predominantly is charged with search and seizure missions as well as daily patrols.   
CTF 151 has been successful in protecting commercial vessel crews while 
simultaneously apprehending pirates.   The coalition forces use visit, board, search, and seizure 
(VBSS) teams to investigate suspected ships and detain any potential pirates.  While reporters 
and policy makers have suggested destroying pirate motherships, the United States operates 
within the bounds of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention.  This allows coalition forces to board 
and retake pirate operated ships; however, blowing up a targeted ship is considered illegal.  
While the weaponry maintained by coalition warships cannot even be compared to the 
equipment used by pirates.  For example, the CTF 151 Flagship, USS Halsey (DDG 97), can 
travel at speeds up to approximately 25 knots and has a crew of 320 US sailors.  In addition, the 
guided missile destroyer carriers (2) MK-41 VLS, (1) 20mm CIWS, (2) MK-32 triple torpedo 
tubes, (2) MK 38 MOD 2 25mm machine gun systems (Doehring 2010).  The combat arms 
aboard the USS Halsey are designed to destroy large naval vessels and land targets thousands of 
miles away.  The skiffs operated by 3-7 pirates, 20-60 feet long, could hardly scratch the paint on 
such a formidable force.  However, military anti-pirate measures are conducted with a fine comb 
rather than a big stick.   
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As discussed in Chapter I, the VBSS teams use precision and finesse in order to protect 
hostages and apprehend pirates.  Similar to the Al Mulahi incident, a 09 September 2010 New 
York Times report by Gettleman and Schmitt described how a maritime raid force (MRF) from 
the 15
th
 Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) conducted a boarding operation and retook control of 
the MV Magellan Star in 2010.  With the support of the Turkish frigate TCG Gökçeada and US 
ships, USS Dubuque and USS Princeton, the 24 US marines forced the nine pirates into 
submission and safely reclaimed the ship and crew.  The Magellan Star incident demonstrates 
despite the overwhelming force advantage claimed by the coalition forces, pirate operations are 
still carried out very carefully.  This increases cost, but protects the safety and welfare of the 
crew and military members. 
CTF 151 and EU NAVFOR ATLANTA have had numerous successes similar to the 
Magellan Star incident.  Over 750 pirates have been prosecuted in over 11 separate countries 
(Oceans Beyond Piracy 2010); however, not all pirates are convicted, and in addition to those 
prosecuted, even more are released after their initial capture.  The legal systems of the 
prosecuting nations are overwhelmed and cannot support the high demand for conviction of 
Somali pirates.  An estimated $31 million is spent each year in prosecution costs of pirates, an 
amount that many small nations cannot afford.  Due to the circumstances, many pirates are 
captured more than once only to be freed.  This has caused a great deal of frustration for the 
crews of the coalition forces.  As sailors note, when a skiff is spotted with ladders it is almost a 
guarantee that they are actively conducting pirate operations.  However, despite this 
incriminating evidence, the current political climate prevents definitive action to be taken in 
many cases.  The impediment imposed upon military forces prevents them from fully performing 
to the fullest of their capabilities which grants pirates nautical impunity.  An increased focus on 
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conviction and detainment, as well as loosening engagement restrictions, would improve the 
effectiveness of military deterrence. 
Despite the effectiveness of military intervention, the premier form of pirate deterrence is 
the use of best management practices (BMP).  Implementation of BMP has the greatest rate of 
success against effectively combating pirates.  Both EU NAVFOR ATALANTA and CTF 151 
advocate the use of the strategies outlined in the publication of BMP.  The first commanding 
Admiral of the CMF, Vice Admiral Bill Gortney (U.S.), warned commercial vessels captains, 
“The most effective measures we’ve seen to defeat piracy are non-kinetic and defensive in 
nature.”  He continues to acknowledge the issues that need to be on land, “But the problem of 
piracy is and continues to be a problem that begins ashore and requires an international solution” 
(CMF 2009).  VADM Gortney’s statement after the creation of CTF 151 highlights the need to 
complement military efforts with concerted nation-building activities.  
 
2.5.B. Best Management Practices 
In a joint effort to educate commercial vessel captains in combating piracy, The U.S. 
Navy Maritime Liason Office (MARLO), Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa (MSCHOA), 
NATO Shipping Centre (NSC), and Operation Ocean Shield have released the fourth version of 
Best Management Practices for Protection against Somalia Based Piracy.  The guide notes that 
majority of successful pirate hijackings are due to the vessel’s failure to adhere to the strategies 
outlined in the training book.  The BMP guide has three absolute requirements: register with 
MSCHOA, report to the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations office (UKMTO)
11
, and 
                                                          
11
 The UKMTO is located in Dubai (BMP 4, 2011). 
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use ship protection measures in case of an attack.  Registration with MSCHOA is completed by 
completing a form that allows anti-piracy organizations to cooperate with coalition forces and 
track commercial vessels traveling through dangerous waters.  The second step, requests ships 
travelling through the waters bounded by the Suez Canal to the north and the grid position 10 
degrees south and 78 degrees east.  In order to report, ships are asked to send a daily email to the 
UKMTO in order to update the ships position.  The latest reported position is used by military 
forces to search for a ship if a distress signal is sent (BMP 4 2011).  The last crucial step to the 
successful implementation of BMP is the effective usage of ship protection measurements 
(SPMs). 
The first suggestion is that ships travel through high risk waters via the Internationally 
Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC).  This majority of coalition forces are concentrated along 
this route.   The BPM distinguishes between two types of activities, deterrent and preventative.  
Deterrent activities include maintaining a constant and alert watch.  Alert watches require 
additional personnel on each watch, rotating often to preserve alertness.  Binoculars, night vision 
goggles, and proper use of radar maximize the effectiveness of watches.  In many cases, pirates 
will choose not to attack a ship that seems to be well prepared to combat a boarding.  In order for 
crews to be properly prepared, ship emergency drills should be practiced prior to entering risky 
waters.  Second, physical preparations of the ship can mitigate damage and even prevent a 
hijack.  These preparations include chain link fences to lessen RPG damage, place barbed wire 
around perimeter of ship, fortify vulnerable surfaces of ship, and provide crew with helmets and 
Kevlar (BMP 4 2011).   
Preventative measures conducted by crews include any activity that attempts to repel a 
pirate attack.  Use of fire hoses and ballast pumps to flood the deck causing water to run off the 
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sides makes it difficult for pirates to board.  Second, alarms and highlighting pirates with lighting 
will aid coalition forces help deter the pirates.  Use of citadels and safe rooms are effective if 
pirates are denied use of critical tools and ship driving capabilities.  Use of armed and unarmed 
security contractors provides experience to the crew which can help fight off pirate attacks.  
Lastly, BMP requires that attacked ships report the attack in order to help anti-piracy 
organizations to alert military forces and warn other commercial vessels (BMP 4 2011).    
Unfortunately, navies find severe difficulty in determining the proper execution of the 
detainment of pirates.  Navies cannot arrest and detain suspected pirates without cause for 
suspicion.  Given this restriction, it is often necessary to catch pirates in the act of a violation of 
international maritime laws.  Therefore, it is rare and difficult for navies to execute the 
aforementioned goals established by the U.S. and the EU.  Furthermore, if international 
enforcement navies are successful in obtaining guilty parties, current policy is to hand judicial 
responsibility to Kenya.  However, Kenya is currently unequipped to handle such a large number 
of cases and pirates are often released without punishment.      
2.5.C. Difficulties of Prosecution 
 While the coalition forces patrolling the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean have had some 
success in detaining pirates, there are significant roadblocks preventing prosecution of pirates.  
There are four crucial impediments in the prosecution of pirates (Percy and Shortland 2011, 9-
10).  One, piracy recruitment occurs on land where it is uncontrolled, therefore, the detainment 
of one group of pirates is easily replaced by another set of pirate recruits.  The labor supply for 
pirates is vast due to the chaotic, jobless, and uncontrolled environment of Somalia.  Secondly, 
the prospect of detention does not create a deterrent effect for pirates because western jails offer 
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more security than Somalia.  Prisons have consistent meals, beds, and sanitary conditions.  These 
may be incentives for pirates to be caught.  Thirdly, African legal systems are not fully capable 
of adjudicating pirates.  Pirates cannot be tried in Somalia due to lack of unbiased courts, and 
trials of pirates in Kenya ended in 2010.  Lastly, it is extremely difficult to provide sufficient 
evidence against pirates unless they are caught in the middle of an attack (Percy and Shortland 
2011).  There are many cases in which pirates are detained only to be released back into Somalia 
due to the inability of the international community to prosecute them. 
 In a 2012 New York Times article by C.J. Chivers on 06 March 2012, he reports that 15 
accused pirates were transferred to Seychelles to await trial.  After a detainment period of two 
months on board three U.S. warships, the pirates face charges of twenty years or more.  
Seychelles has become a large adjudication resource for the trials of pirates.  Convicted pirates 
are sent to a U.N. financed prison that has been established in Somaliland, Somalia.  The journey 
of the suspected pirates provides a testament to the difficulty of prosecuting those suspected of 
piracy.  Furthermore, the implicit costs associated with the detainment and conviction of pirates 
are extremely high for the U.S. military, Seychelles, and the U.N.  The establishment of the U.N. 
prison and efforts by Seychelles represent some steps taken by the international community to 
enforce punishment of piracy.  However, this process will need to be brought to the source of 
pirates on land in order to experience success. 
 Chapter II has outlined the root causes of Somali piracy and discussed the different 
methods which are currently being used to combat it.  The deterrence methods, conducted by 
both the international coalition forces and private shipping companies, are the police force 
preventing Somali pirates from completely stopping the commercial shipping through the Gulf of 
Aden, Red Sea, and Indian Ocean.  In Chapter III, the Somali pirate situation is put into the 
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context of Gary Becker’s Economic Theory of Crime and Punishment.  By putting the piracy 
situation into terms defined by Becker’s theory, it will allow for an evaluation of the effective 
deterrence methods currently being used and how a long term solution is the only way to 
stabilize the area and put an end to pirates operating with impunity. 
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CHAPTER III 
APPLICATION OF THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 
It is a commonly held misconception that the Somali pirate community is comprised of 
lawless and unorganized outlaws.  Reports of hijackings and attacks on merchant ships rarely 
give an insight into the thought processes of the assailants.  These reports often assert that 
pirates, like most criminals, do not engage in a rational decision making process.  Contrary to 
these beliefs, Becker’s Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach (1968), suggests that 
criminals in fact undergo a series of rational decisions, a process that can be applied to the 
Somali pirate community. 
Starting with Adam Smith in the eighteenth century, economists and philosophers 
demonstrated interest in the relation between crime and economics.  Smith related the need for 
protection from crime with the accumulation of wealth and Jeremy Bentham, a utilitarian 
philosopher, was concerned with the reaction of criminals to legal policies (Ehrlich 1997, 43).   
This field of economic study postulates that criminal activity is predicated upon a rational 
decision-making process that dictates whether a criminal will choose to commit a crime or 
abstain.  The fundamental question of the theory is what is the optimal amount of crime in a 
given society?  The optimal amount of crime is dependent upon the difference between the 
amount of resources allocated to preventing and prosecuting illegal activities versus the net 
damage to society as a result of the crime. The addition of the economic perspective to the study 
of criminology presents a new mechanism with which criminal activity can be studied.  
Furthermore, the application of this theoretical disposition to the study of pirate deterrence can 
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help illuminate some previously aspects of pirate decision-making which could provide 
knowledge to the arsenal of policy makers. 
 
3.1: Basic Components  
 Utopias envision realms of perfect order and prosperity. Although the prospect of a 
crime-free society seems desirable on the surface, Becker’s theory supplies an explanation that 
describes why a world without crime would actually be dystopian, more similar to George 
Orwell’s, Nineteen Eighty-Four.  In order for a society to exist without any criminal activity, 
complete allocation of resources would have to be devoted to police activity
12
.  Becker notes that 
while it may be possible to eradicate major felonies, such as murder, assault, and armed 
robberies, which account for a smaller percentage of criminal activity, it is not possible to rid 
society of all crime.  The costs associated with dissolving all crime, which includes white collar 
crimes, the marginal cost of policing and prosecuting each individual crime would far outweigh 
the net damage done to the society as a consequence of the crime committed.  Therefore, unless a 
society is willing to forgo all personal liberty and abandon all lose all benefits from social 
programs in return for complete lawfulness, the utopia paradigm is impossible.  What Becker’s 
theory provides is a mechanism with which to determine the appropriate amount of crime that a 
society allows, given a government’s resources and institutional strength13.   
 Becker’s model establishes the follwoing five categories which are fundamental in 
deriving an optimality condition (Becker 1968, 172).     
                                                          
12
 This is one way to reach utopian society.  Optimistic approaches to reaching utopia require all persons to 
subscribe to the same values.  This situation is equally unable to be controlled completely by governing policy. 
13
 The amount of resources needed for policing a society is dependent upon the degree to which a society “buys in” 
to the legal system in place. 
 
 
37 
 
1. The number of crimes and cost of offenses 
2. The number of crimes processed and adjudicated 
3. Government expenditures on maintaining a police force, prisons, and judicial systems 
4. Number of convictions and the cost of judicial processing as well as imprisonment and 
other punishments 
5. private expenditure on protection  
These categories are used to determine different the effects of consequences on several factors 
such as net societal damages, the cost of apprehension and conviction, criminal labor market, 
assignment of punishments, and optimality conditions.   
3.1.A. Net Damages to Society 
 The net damage to society is defined by Becker as the net harm to society as a result of 
the crime subtracted by the net gain that the criminal receives from an illegal action, as explained 
by the equation D(O) = H (O) – G (O).  Where damage done by a crime is D(O), harm to society 
is defined as H(O) and the gain by the criminal is G(O). Both damage to a society and gain to the 
criminal are functions of the total number of offenses (O).   Net harm to society can include, but 
is not limited to, physical and psychological damage to the victim, damage to property, and fiscal 
or property loss of the victim.  In many cases of petty crimes, the net damage to society is going 
to be the emotional distress of the victim.  For example, if a thief steals a man’s wallet on a busy 
street, the economic net gain for society is zero.  However, the victim still suffers due to the 
distress caused by being without his driver’s license, credit cards, and any other property kept is 
his wallet, in addition to the sense of injustice.  Therefore, the net loss to society is the distress 
caused to the victim as well as the lingering injustice.  In Becker’s model, larger magnitudes of 
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net loss to society warrant larger amounts resources policing and prosecution.  This means that, 
at the margin, more serious crimes, such as murder or armed robbery, garner more attention and 
resources expended by police forces.  In the case of piracy, societal net loss extends to increased 
opportunity costs, increased security costs, damage to commercial vessels, in addition to the 
ransom and crew suffrage (Becker 1968, 173).   
3.1.B. Cost of Apprehension and Conviction 
 The cost of catching and prosecuting criminals entails more resources than wages for 
police, court personnel, and prison employees.  Police and court “activity,” as defined by Becker, 
includes inputs of labor, supplies, and capital.  Becker provides the production function for the 
level of technology and proficiency of the judicial system, which is defined as A= h (p, O, a). In 
this case, activity equals the net harm per offense (h), which is a function of probability of 
conviction (p), total number of offenses (O), and the number of arrests and determinants of 
activity (a).  In the case of piracy, increases in activity would include increased military 
technology, reporting centers, alarm systems, safe rooms/citadels, other defense systems on 
board commercial vessels, as well as increases to the capability of judicial and punitive measures 
enforced by Somali and international courts. Increases in the level of A (activity) would increase 
the overall cost.  Simultaneously, an increase in activity would also increase the total number of 
offenses that lead to convictions (pO).  Transitively, an increase in the probability of conviction 
(p) would increase the overall cost of apprehending criminals, as demonstrated by the function 
C= C(p, O, a) (Becker 1968, 175).       
 
 
 
 
39 
 
3.1.C. Criminal Labor Market 
Similar to the “legal” labor market, the supply of criminals is determined by a model of 
cost-benefit rationality.  However, the costs associated with the criminal labor market are risks 
associated with crime, which include risks of detection, prosecution, and punishment.  While 
workers in the “legal” labor market concern themselves with a balance between labor and 
leisure, determined by wages per hour of labor, criminals decide whether the monetary benefits 
of a specific crime outweigh the cost of punishment.  Several factors affect the decision-making 
process of a criminal.  These risks include, the probability of being caught per offense (p), 
severity of punishment per offense (f), and an institutional variable per offense (u).  The 
institutional variable is dependent on the current state of the social atmosphere.  Considered in 
the institutional variable are availability of social programs/welfare programs, level of education, 
and availability of legal employment. The consideration of these variables comprises the 
function for total number of offenses: 
O= O(p, f, u) 
The variables for probability of conviction, as discussed in the previous section, is dependent on 
activity or allocation of resources to police measures; the severity of punishment is established 
by law within each jurisdiction of the respective governing body; and the institutional variable is 
a constant that depends on alternative revenue earning options, average education levels, and 
social infrastructure, including social programs.  The only variables that policy-makers are able 
to directly influence are p and f.  However, the institutional variable can be affected by 
improvements in the state of infrastructure in both the private and public sector.  Changes in the 
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institutional variable cannot be changed in the short run.
14
  Therefore, in the case of piracy, the 
only tools available to international powers, in the short run, are to choose the appropriate levels 
of allocation to military efforts, vessel protection levels, and determining levels of punishment 
for each act of piracy in order to convict and prosecute criminals.  Becker also establishes that, at 
the margin, increasing p or f would decrease the utility of the criminal and subsequently reducing 
the number of crimes.  He accomplishes this by first representing the number of crimes as 
occurring in a specific time period where Oƒ= Oƒ (pƒ, fƒ, uƒ).  (Oƒ ) is the number of offenses that 
occur in time period (ƒ).  Therefore: 
Opƒ= (δ Oƒ / δ pƒ) < 0  or  Ofƒ= (δ Oƒ / δ fƒ) < 0 
These equations demonstrate that an increase in p or f would decrease the total number of crimes 
during period (ƒ), at the margin (Becker 1968, 177-180). 
Just like in the “legal” labor market, individuals value wages and labor differently, 
criminals are sensitive to these variables in different degrees.  For example, a criminal with a 
preference for risk would increase the number of crimes if resources were allocated so that 
probability of being caught increased proportionate to a decrease in the severity of punishment.  
Therefore, the elasticities of a criminal in the illegal labor market are determined by their 
preference for increased probability of capture of increased severity of punishment.  As 
discussed previously in this paper, the inability of African and international judicial systems to 
effectively prosecute Somali pirates suggests that pirates have preference for risk.  A further 
discussion of the consequences of the failure of the prosecution variable in the Somali pirate 
context can be found in chapter three.  
                                                          
14
 In the case of fishing piracy, see Section 2.2, abolishing IUUs from Somali waters would increase the institutional 
variable in the short run.  If EU naval efforts are effective in limiting IUUs, increases in fishing employment would 
have a short run effect on the institutional variable, thus affecting the pirates’ decision making process. 
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3.1.D. Assignment of Punishment 
Becker introduces fines as a cost-saving alternative to imprisonment.  However, in the 
case of piracy, fines are not a possible means of punishment.  The point of a fine is to impose a 
fiscal punishment on a perpetrator, beyond the gains of the illegal exploits, provided they have a 
means to pay the fine.  In the case of Somali pirates, as discussed in chapter II, the Somali pirates 
have no ability to pay a fine, other than with money supplied by previous ransoms of commercial 
vessels.  Forfeiture of hijacking profits would not be a sufficient to create a deterrent effect.  The 
pirates would only lose what they had just stolen, thus effectively breaking even.  Fines are only 
effective if the fine is larger than the net gain from a crime.  Therefore, fines would not deter 
pirates from committing another crime.  With that said, the option of fining pirates is completely 
impossible.  Therefore, those interested in prosecuting pirates must rely on the alternative, and 
more common forms of punitive action.  These most of include forms of restriction, 
imprisonment, and in extreme cases, capital punishment.   
Unfortunately, punishments, other than fines, carry an implicit social cost.  Prosecution 
and imprisonment carry a high social cost because prisoners are no longer part of the laboring 
and taxpaying community; instead, prisoners become completely reliant on the state for basic 
living necessities.  In addition to the costs of providing the basic needs of prisoners, taxpayers 
pay the wages of prison guards and employees as well as the costs of maintaining of prisons.  
Becker understands the social cost of imprisonment to equal f’= bf, where (f’) equals the social 
cost and (b) is a coefficient that represents the cost on society determined by the magnitude of 
the punishment.  For example, the cost on a society of sending a criminal to a maximum security 
prison versus a minimum security prison. (Becker 1968, 180).  The coefficient (b) transforms 
severity of punishment (f) into the social cost of a punishment per criminal (f’).  The debate over 
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international responsibility for the prosecution and imprisonment is a derivation over this high 
social cost of imprisoning pirates.
15
       
 
3.2 The Model and Optimality Conditions 
 As stated in the previous section, policy-makers are only given the ability to set the levels 
of p and f in order to deter crime and allow the optimal amount of crime to occur.  First, in order 
to determine the amount of crime that maximizes social welfare, Becker established a social 
welfare function that states: 
L = D(O) + C (p, O) + bpfO 
The equation sets social welfare (L) equal to damage of offenses (D), the amount spent on 
combating offenses (C), and the total social loss from punishments and imprisonments (bpfO).  
From this equation, Becker obtained his first order conditions, which provide an insight into the 
effects of changing p and f.  The marginal cost of increasing the number of offenses, whether 
through a reduction in p or f, is equal to the average revenue of each offense (-bpf) multiplied by 
the elasticity of criminal preference for risk or punishment (1- 1/ εf  or 1- 1/ εp) (Becker 1968, 
181-182).  The model assumes that, for the perpetrator, there are decreasing marginal returns to 
each subsequent number of crimes committed.   This is due to the increased likelihood of capture 
and conviction for each number of crimes committed.  Also, if there are few criminals in the 
illegal labor market who cause low levels of net damage to society, there will be limited 
resources allocated to police efforts.  With increases in the level of crime, policy-makers react by 
allocating more funding to preventing and prosecuting crime.  Although it is progressively more 
                                                          
15
 See chapter II 
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risky for criminals to engage in more and more criminal acts, it is also more costly for governing 
bodies when there is more crime.  There are decreasing marginal revenues for criminals, and 
increasing marginal costs for governing bodies.  For example, if there is only one criminal in the 
illegal labor market who commits only one crime and quits, the marginal revenue is high because 
the chances of being caught are significantly lower.  There would be little police response and 
the criminal would have a low probability of conviction.  In this situation, the total net loss 
would be almost zero.  Conversely, in a society where crime is rampant and police efforts are 
extreme, the cost of convicting and prosecuting each individual criminal becomes increasingly 
more costly.  For the criminal, the illegal labor market would yield low revenue streams because 
the chances of being caught would be much higher due to the increased police efforts.  This 
would net a huge social net loss (Becker 1968, 181).   
 In order for a policy-making body to reach an optimal level of crime and crime 
prevention, they must choose the number of offenses where the marginal cost for the government 
equals the marginal revenue for criminals than seeking legal forms of employment.  In order to 
do this, they have to choose the levels of p and f that make it more costly for criminals to join the 
illegal labor market.  This is because criminals will continue to join the illegal labor market until 
it is unprofitable for them.  Until the optimal amount of offenses is reached, the police force is a 
reactive body.  This means that, criminals will continue to join the illegal labor market until it is 
unprofitable; therefore, the police will be forced to increase efforts until the number of police and 
severity of punishment create a situation in which the probability of facing an adverse prison 
sentence outweighs the gains of committing the crime.  This occurs in the zone of optimal 
offenses.  
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 Another possible explanation for the decreasing marginal returns to crime is that police 
initially focus on the most harmful crimes initially.  Thus, as crime and deterrence efforts 
increase, the focus of the policy-makers is to abolish the majority of the most detrimental and 
despicable crimes, such as murder, rape, massive extortion, and armed robbery.  Therefore, 
police efforts will mostly focus on these criminals, and lower level criminals, predominantly 
white collar criminals, slip through the cracks.  However, as more resources are given to police 
efforts and punishments become increasingly severe, criminals may opt to engage in smaller 
scale operations.  These are crimes that are harder to convict, demanding high operational 
budgets, but yield little revenue for the criminal.  This also would create a massive net loss.  
Therefore, a more desirable social policy would be to allow some crimes continue and focus on 
the more socially harmful crimes.  This would also place a society in the socially optimal zone of 
offenses. 
 In equilibrium, Becker asserts that criminals are “risk preferrers,” at the margin.  Under 
these conditions, if a criminal labor market is at equilibrium, individuals would not enter the 
illegal labor market because they would be able to make a better salary, adjusted for risk, in legal 
avenues of employment.  Therefore, optimality in Becker’s model is the point at which police 
efforts and punishment strategies create a situation in which legal employment is more profitable 
than the expected value of crime.  In order to so, Becker’s model provides policy-makers a guide 
to allocate crime deterrence resources at optimal levels (Becker 1968, 208-209).  
 Applying Becker’s theory to Somali piracy highlights the fundamental problems within 
Somalia.  Becker’s model depends on the presence of a reactionary governing body that has the 
ability to police, adjudicate, and punish crime within their sovereign territory.  This is not the 
case in Somalia.  Therefore, as demonstrated in this chapter, criminals and pirates alike make 
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rational decisions regarding their crimes.  If the risk adjusted revenue from a crime is lower than 
profits from the legal labor market, individuals will choose not to join the illegal labor market.  
However, with the current state of Somalia several disruptive factors prevent Somali and 
international governing bodies from issuing justice, and in turn, deterring piracy.  One, there is 
no consistent legal process that threatens pirates with punishment.  Two, due to economic crises, 
crop failure, civil war, and encroachment of illegal fishermen there are sparse opportunity for 
Somalis to find work that sufficiently provides for their families.  Lastly, an issue of 
responsibility exists which prevents a single governing body from providing necessary funding 
for prosecution and punishment.  These issues are discussed in length in chapter IV.         
3.3 Behavioral Consequences of the Model 
 Since the formalization of the economic theory of crime and punishment in Becker 
(1968), a new focus of economic study was introduced.  The cascade of economic literature 
following from Becker’s seminal paper introduced new applications of the theory as well as 
refined factors established in Becker (1968).  The range of these studies varied from private 
protection and self-insurance as in (Ehrlich and Becker 1972) and (Ehrlich 1997) to organized 
crime versus individual crime as seen in (Chang, Lu, and Chen 2007).  Although many papers 
have been written on the subject of the economic theory of crime and punishment, this section 
will focus on these subjects due to their direct relationship with several key issues in the context 
of Somali piracy that were not covered in Becker (1968).  For example, private insurance and 
private protection will help explain the case for use of private ship security teams, anti-piracy 
measures, and commercial insurance.  Also, pirates do not operate as individual perpetrators; 
rather, they are organized into various groups, operating in tandem with other pirate teams 
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aboard motherships.  Therefore, examining the decision making choices afforded to organized 
crime will allow policy makers to better combat recruitment. 
 First, as an alternative to buying market insurance, commercial vessels have two options 
in order to mitigate expected losses.  Self insurance and self protection are both options, 
examined in (Ehrlich and Becker 1979), that provide an alternative to market insurance that 
reduce the size of losses and decrease the probability of a loss respectively.  Self insurance, in 
the case of preventing piracy, can be considered any actions which are taken by the individual or 
the company that owns the vessel that mitigate risk of hijack or damage.  Examples of self- 
insurance on commercial vessels are utilization of BMP, fire prevention equipment and alarm 
systems, safe rooms/citadels, and alarm systems that notify local military vessels and naval 
response centers.  Self-protection includes security teams and anti-piracy equipment and training.  
While market insurance costs are equal to periodic payments to a firm, self-insurance and self-
protection cost initial capital.  Ehrlich and Becker demonstrate that self-insurance focuses and 
market insurance are substitutes.  However, market insurance is more apt to cover rare losses, 
whereas self-insurance is more capable of mitigating losses from more commonplace damages 
associated with being the victim of a crime (Ehrlich and Becker 1979, 635-637).  While self-
protection does not change potential losses from a successful hijacking, it decreases the 
probability of being hijacked.  However, in the case of piracy, this can be a dangerous strategy 
that could potentially lead to an exchange of deadly fire between pirates and a vulnerable crew.  
There is no evidence that claims that insured ships take less preventative measures in order to 
maintain safety.  However, it is possible that a captain of an insured ship may advise his crew to 
take more precaution when under direct attack from pirates due to the comfort of a potentially 
shorter captivity period or the increased probability of a rescue.   
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 While Becker (1968) only allows for policy makers to reach an optimal amount of 
offenses by negotiating appropriate levels of police funding and punishment, Ehrlich (1997) adds 
mitigating variables, such as private protection which is discussed as self insurance in (Ehrlich 
and Becker, 1979).   Ehrlich determines that individuals’ levels of private protection spending 
react to higher rates of crime or increased probability of being a victim.  Also introduced in 
Ehrlich (1997) is the idea that economic growth and capital accumulation by firms and 
individuals increases the profitability of criminals.  This also applies to the piracy victims.  As 
international economic growth continues, cargo becomes more valuable and aggregate tonnage 
traveling through pirate-infested waters increases.  These factors increase the profitability 
potential for pirates, which may lead to injections of new pirates into the pirate labor market.  
Finally, Ehrlich differentiates between the two strategies of deterrence, those which rely on 
negative incentives and positive incentives and which deal with a greater focus of rehabilitation 
and labor alternative.  Ehrlich testifies that both negative and positive incentives are able to deter 
crime.  However, positive incentive programs, such as labor training subsidies, provide a much 
lessened burden on social welfare.  This application of alternatives is briefly seen in Becker 
(1968) in his institutional variable, but is elaborated upon by Ehrlich (1997).  The positive 
incentive strategy can be an effective deterrent tool for limiting the pirate labor market if 
alternative labor projects can be developed.  While there have not been sufficient efforts to 
provide alternative employment in Somalia, the converse incentive has been observed.  For 
example, due to the presence of IUUs, as discussed in section 2.2, many Somalis left the fishing 
labor market and joined illegal pirate gangs.  Therefore, if profitable labor can be supplied, it 
should deter a portion of pirates away from the pirate labor market. 
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 In other studies of piracy, the reasons for piracy are a function of risk, opportunity, 
resources, and poverty (Percy and Shortland 2009).  This is very similar to Becker’s reasons for 
crime.  In this case, risk is considered as a combination of enforcement of naval laws by military 
coalitions and weather conditions (monsoons).  Resources refer to the amount of input capital 
available; there is evidence that the input costs are provided by financiers.  Piracy is also a result 
of poverty which has been demonstrated by Chapter II.  Lastly, pirates take advantage of the 
natural geographical chokepoints adjacent to the Somali coast which are also one of the most 
frequently traveled by valuable commercial traders (Percy and Shortland 2009).  The input 
factors provided in Percy and Shortland (2009) do not consider punitive risk; however, the 
decision factors of pirates demonstrate a close similarity to Becker’s model of criminal decision-
making.   
 Both Ehrlich and Becker (1979) and Ehrlich (1997) focus on deterrence by governing 
bodies and individuals.  Chang, Lu, and Chen (2005) investigate the benefits of operating within 
an organized group of criminals.  This paper is pertinent to the discussion of piracy because 
pirates are not individual operators and rely on “mothership” crews and attack commercial 
vessels in teams of four to seven pirates.  In Chang, Lu, and Chen (2005), the number and type of 
criminals that join a criminal organization are endogenous.  Furthermore, the study expresses 
how joining a criminal organization, or in this case a pirate group, carries an extra benefit.  
Additional benefits include greater influence, criminal networking, protection from competitors 
and rivals, improved capital and technology (Abadinsky 1994).  These benefits are crucial for 
Somali pirates in conducting operations.   
While many suspect that the pirate gangs have close ties to the Somali terrorist group, Al 
Shabbab, these reports are unfounded.  However, reports have demonstrated that pirates are 
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being financed by wealthy African businessmen.  Feelings of immunity have inspired financiers 
of piracy, within Somalia, to boast their profits.  Saeed Yare, a pirate financier, claims to have 
accrued 2.4 million USD from ransom payments in a single year (Murphy 2011). This type of 
financing scheme demonstrates that pirates operate within fairly organized operating groups.  
Without the presence of an established organization, pirates would not have the ability to 
purchase semi-automatic weapons and rocket propelled grenades that are used in the majority of 
hijackings.  Furthermore, it is suspect that pirates pay a share of ransom earnings to tribal leaders 
for protection purposes.  The first assertion made in Chang, Lu, and Chen (2005) is that, in a 
revenue uniform distribution scheme, low skill criminals will choose to operate individually, 
while those with some skill will join the organized crime market.  This suggests that if this 
proposition is consistent with Somali pirates, many pirates are former fishermen or have an 
aptitude for using weapons.  In order to try and discourage individuals from joining the 
organized crime labor market, Chang, Lu, and Chen (2005) advocates serving organized 
criminals with harsher penalties.  The study justifies this strategy by noting that harsher penalties 
increase the entry fee into organized crime and, in some cases dissuades individuals from 
joining.  This treatment of pirates as an organization, as opposed to individual criminals, may 
provide a unique way in which to prosecute them as a group.  If so, harsher penalties may 
dissuade potential pirates from joining hijackings and opt for other means of revenue.  
Furthermore, due to the capital and technological necessities associated with piracy, those 
individuals that are dissuaded from joining, as a result of harsher penalties, will not become 
pirates because of funding restraints.              
In order to impose harsher penalties on pirate organizations, a police effort must first take 
place within the Somali borders.  Therefore, this technique would fall under the long term 
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solution to ending piracy.  Due to the necessity of organization in order to finance and conduct 
pirate attacks, dismantling pirate gangs would inhibit the effectiveness of all pirates.  It is very 
improbable that pirates would be able to operate in small gangs, 5-6, without the support of 
financers and a larger organization to protect them and their large influxes of capital.  In order to 
effectively take apart the pirate organizations, part of the rebuilding process of Somali 
infrastructure must include rooting out and punishing leaders of pirate gangs.  This includes 
financiers and organizational heads.  If this is accomplished, it is fathomable that pirates would 
no longer find safe harbor in Somalia.  For this reason, it is argued in Percy and Shortland (2011) 
that piracy is not able to be controlled by naval mechanisms because it is a land-based problem 
in a land where anarchy is the presiding political environment.  The inability of naval forces is 
predicated upon the inability of naval forces to persecute the root of piracy.  Naval forces and 
deterrence strategies are only able to increase the risk of capture and decrease expected revenue 
of pirates.  The threat of punitive action is still largely questionable, and more importantly, pirate 
leader and financiers operate with impunity.  Leaders are able to recruit and organize 
disenfranchised Somali youths within the shield of chaos provided by the unstable nature of 
Somalia. 
There are reports of pirate organizations growing on land, which may account for the 
increase in pirate attacks in recent years.  Pirates have created a community in which members 
can profit through the purchase of “shares” in a crude pirate stock exchange (Hallwood and 
Miceli 2011, 5).  According to pirate shareholders, the scope of pirate operations has increased to 
72 “maritime companies” and shareholders receive returns on their investment (Minney 2010).  
According to a 22 year old investor, she received a 75,000 USD return in 38 days from an initial 
investment of a RPG (Minney 2010).  Whether there is merit to these claims, it is troubling to 
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imagine the increases of pirate sophistication of such a large magnitude.  The ultimate solution is 
to engineer a politically feasible way in which to empower a Somali government and create an 
effective police force.  Until then, the international community will continue naval efforts.  In 
defense of the current naval strategy employed by the United States, Secretary of State Hilary 
Clinton stated, “[you] have to try to put out the fire before rebuilding the house” (Spearin 2010).  
Given the international circumstances, it does not seem that a full commitment to the long run 
solution, of rebuilding Somalia, is probable in the near future. Therefore, the statistical model 
will focus on maximizing the effectiveness of the short run deterrence activities currently in 
place.  
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CHAPTER IV 
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF PIRATE DETERRENCE STRATEGIES 
 Chapters II and III have demonstrated that pirates operate in response to potential gains 
from ransom payments as well as captured vessels and property.  Furthermore, pirates are 
maritime criminals, and like criminals, they make rational decisions whether to commit an act of 
piracy based on the likelihood of punishment and the severity of punishment.  Pirates are 
threatened by international coalition forces, which parallel police activities in sovereign states, 
and individual commercial ships also practice anti-piracy activities.  As discussed in Chapter II, 
the judicial institutions assigned to handle piracy are inconsistent and in many cases ineffective.  
Therefore, this study will focus on how the deterrent strategies, individual anti-piracy measures 
undertaken by commercial vessels and military policing, affect the success rates of pirates and 
their expected revenue.  If the analysis finds that the deterrence activities are effectively reducing 
the success rate of pirates, the supply of pirates may begin to decline in reaction to the decreased 
expected revenue.   
 The purpose of analyzing the reported data regarding pirate attacks on vessels traveling 
through waters adjacent to Somalia is to determine which short run deterrence methods have had 
the greatest affect on preventing successful hijackings.  The deterrence strategies represent the 
police spending variable in Becker’s theory.  The solution to combating Somali piracy is broken 
down into the two policy variables provided by Becker, which include police spending (short 
run) and the judicial assignment of punishment (long run).  The long run method, which is 
expected to have a greater deterrence effect on pirates, is not covered within the scope of this 
research.  Therefore, the research focuses on the effect of deterrence strategies. 
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 The deterrence strategies work in two capacities that have a deterrent effect on pirates.  
One, measures taken by commercial or private that decrease the likelihood of a successful 
hijacking decreases the expected revenue from piracy
16
.  Two, military intervention may result in 
the detention of pirates.  Within Becker’s model, this is equivalent to probability of arrest.  By 
determining which strategies have the best effect on decreasing the probability of success while 
simultaneously making it more risky for pirates to operate, policy can be suggested for the 
optimal allocation of resources.  The model will first examine how effective the various 
strategies are; then, the coefficients will be used in combination with the estimated costs to 
determine the expenditure necessary for the successful implantation of anti-piracy measures.     
 In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the various deterrence activities discussed in this 
paper, I will use two types of econometric regressions, a probit analysis and an ordinary least 
squares regression.  A random sample of 100 pirate attacks was taken from the total number of 
pirate attacks (502) over the course of 2006-2010.  In order to ensure that all five years are 
represented proportionally, the total number of attacks from each year was divided by 502.  A 
random sample was taken from each year according to the percentage, from each respective year, 
of the total number of attacks.  The number of incidents from each year, in the sample, are as 
follows: 2010 = 36, 2009 = 35, 2008 = 18, 2007 = 7, and 2006 = 4.  Each incident was accessed 
through IMB Piracy Reports 2006-2010.  The reports provided the majority of the data used in 
the regression.  However, for data not reported in IMB 2006-2010
17
, research was done into each 
individual hijacking in order to determine which deterrence activities were utilized, amount of 
                                                          
16
 Pirates have two choices when they face a significant decrease in ability to hijack ships.  One, find another means 
of employment that has a higher risk adjusted expected revenue.  Two, find a financier to improve technology.  
There have been reports of pirate financiers.  The long term solution of increasing the effectiveness of a Somali 
government to police actions within its sovereignty would address this problem (Murphy 2011). 
17
 Almost every incident that lacked data concerning deterrence activities utilized were ships that had been 
successfully hijacked. 
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ransom paid, and length of captivity.  Resources used to find the information were general web 
searches.  Sources of information came from international news agencies, interviews, and 
various databases/ individual reports.
18
  If data was not available for a single incident, that data 
point was omitted and a random number generator was used to determine the replacement
19
. 
Deterrence activities and pirate capital are denoted by a binary variable in both regressions. The 
two analyses will use two different dependent variables, a binary variable for hijack success will 
be used in the probit analysis and the ransom payment is the dependent variable in the least 
squares regression. 
 In this study, the international community is seen as one policy-making agency.  
Therefore, the total amount of funding allocated towards anti-piracy efforts determines the 
probability of catching and convicting a pirate.  The allocation of anti-piracy funding into the 
various activities also affects the probability of conviction, depending upon relative cost to 
effectiveness.  Therefore, by recognizing which strategies have the greatest effect on decreasing 
the percentage of successful hijackings, optimal allocation will increase the probability of 
conviction of pirates.  Given the criminal supply function from Becker’s theory, an increase in 
conviction probability decreases the expected utility of pirates which also decreases the total 
labor supply of pirates.  The two regression equations are as follows: 
(1) HIJACKi = β0 +β1EVMNSi + β2SECTEAMi + β3ANTPMRSi + β4SUEZi + β5GRTi + 
β6MONSOONi + β7YEARi + β8MONTHi+ Ɛi 
                                                          
18
 Resources used to determine missing data are not guaranteed to be entirely accurate.   
19
 The replacement incident was taken from randomly generated from a sample that was the same as the omitted data 
point.  For instance, if a successful hijack from 2008 was omitted, a replacement was generated from successful 
attacks in 2008.  This method was used in order to maintain the same proportion of successful attacks as the original 
generated sample. 
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(2) RANSOMi = β0 +β1ANTPMRSi + β2EVMNSi + β3CITADELi + β4SECTEAMi + β5MILINTi 
+ β6HOSTAGESi + β7GRTi + β8MONSOONi + β9PRTBRDVSLi + β10PRTINPTi + β11SUEZi + 
β12LGTCAPTVi + β13YEARi + β14MONTHi + Ɛi 
4.1:  Discussion of the Variables 
 The LHS variables are a binary variable for successful hijacks (HIJACK) and a variable 
that measures the total revenue earned by pirates for a single pirate attack (RANSOM).  The 
Right Hand Side (RHS) variables that measure deterrence strategies are evasive maneuvers 
(EVMNS), military intervention (MILINT), ship security team (SECTEAM), and anti-piracy 
measures (ANTPMRS), and installation of a safe room/citadel (CITADEL).  Also, included are 
variables for the number of hostages taken in a hijacking (HOSTAGES) and the length of 
captivity for the hostages (LGTCAPTV).   
       
TABLE 4: 
List of Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) 
 
       
       Dependent Variable       
HIJACK X X     
RANSOM   X X X  
Independent Variable       
ANTPMRS X X X X X  
EVMNS X X X X X  
CITADEL   X X X  
SECTEAM X X X X X  
MILINT X X X X X  
HOSTAGES     X  
GRT  X  X X  
MONSOON  X  X X  
PRTINPT  X  X X  
SUEZ  X  X X  
LGTCAPTV     X  
       
       The RHS control variables are the total number of ships that travel through the Suez Canal each 
moth (SUEZ), the gross registered tonnage of the ship attacked (GRT), an estimated cost for the 
pirates input (PRTINPT), a binary variable for whether the pirates are able to board the vessel 
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(PRTBRDVSL), and a dummy variable for the monsoon season (MONSOON).  Table 4 includes a 
list of all the variables, Table 5 contains a brief definition for each variable, and Table 6 presents 
the descriptive statistics of all the variables. 
Table 5: Definitions for all Variables 
Dependent Variables: 
1. HIJACK: Assigns a one or a zero to each observation depending on whether the attacking 
pirates were able to gain control of the ship or not respectively. 
2. RANSOM: The amount of ransom paid to the pirates for the safe return of the crew and 
property (vessel, cargo, and personal property). 
Independent Variables: 
1. ANTPMRS: Any use of the best management practices, as discussed in section 2.5.B.  
Binary variable; equals one in any attack in which BMPs were utilized by the victim 
vessel. 
2. EVMNS: Binary variable that assigns a one to any incident in which evasive maneuvers 
were taken by the captain of the vessel being attacked in an attempt to impede a pirate 
attack. 
3. CITADEL: Binary variable that equals one if the attacked vessel has a citadel or 
saferoom. 
4. SECTEAM: Binary variable that equals one if the attacked vessel has a security team 
aboard. 
5. MILINT: Binary variable that equals one if any type of military intervention is employed 
during a pirate attack.  Military intervention is any situation in which coalition forces are 
present during an attack, are conducting a convoy of commercial ships, or are deployed to 
stop an active pirate attack. 
6. HOSTAGES: Measures the number of hostages that are taken during a pirate attack.  
Crew members are only considered hostages if the pirates successfully hijack the ship. 
7. GRT: Gross registered tonnage.  Measures the size of the ship. 
8. MONSOON: Binary variable that assigns a one to any incident that occurs during a 
month that is in the monsoon season.  The monsoon lasts from the end of May to the 
beginning of September. 
9. PRTINPT: Measures the approximated amount of input capital that the pirates use in a 
single attack.  Approximated by year, anecdotal evidence of resources (skiff engine, 
weapons, GPS, etc.).  
10. SUEZ: Proxy variable for the number of ships that travel through the Gulf of Aden and 
Indian Ocean per month.  The SUEZ variable measures the number of registered ships 
that travel through the Suez Canal each month. 
11. LGTCAPTV: Meausres the number of months that hostages are held captive after a 
hijacking. 
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Max/Min Standard Dev. Number Obvs. 
HIJACK* .28 1/0 0.45267 100 
RANSOM 464,265 5,500,000/0 4948.44 100 
ANTPMRS* .73 1/0 0.44763 100 
EVMNS* .53 1/0 0.5016 100 
CITADEL* .05 1/0 0.27266 100 
SECTEAM* .02 1/0 0.1407 100 
MILINT* .26 1/0 0.4408 100 
HOSTAGES 5.11 39/0 9.7689 100 
GRT 27960.15 164292/100 34311.95 100 
MONSOON* .18 1/0 0.386 100 
PRTINPT 12690 14,000/10,000 1931.63 100 
SUEZ 1557.11 1,993/1,313 164.76 100 
LGTCAPTV 1.305 13/0 2.935 100 
Note: *= Binary 
Variable 
 
 
From Table 6, for each binary variable (indicated by an asterisk), the mean statistic is 
also the fraction of incidents in which the variable was expressed.  For example, 28% of all ships 
were reported hijacked in the sample.  Secondly, the large discrepancy between ships in reported 
GRT is due to the differences in size between container ships and yachts.   
The binary dependent variable is evaluated by a probit analysis.  In the probit regression, 
the dependent variable is a binary variable that designates whether pirates were successful or 
unsuccessful in an attack on a vessel.  The goal is to examine how the anti-piracy efforts have 
affected the percentage of successful pirate attacks from 2006-2010.  The probit analysis 
provides an insight into the disincentive factors of the successful implementation of deterrence 
strategies.  From the regression significance and magnitudes of coefficients, it can be inferred 
which strategies have experienced the greatest success.  The goal of the analysis is to offer 
insights into which strategies should receive more attention and resources.  If commercial vessels 
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and international forces are able to decrease the success rate of hijackings, it becomes more 
costly for Somalis to engage in pirate activities.  Therefore, a combination of alternative legal 
labor opportunities, for Somalis, and decreased success rates of piracy could lead to a decrease in 
the overall number of pirates.   
 The dependent variable for the second set of regressions measures the revenue earned by 
pirates as a result of a successful hijacking of a commercial vessel or yacht, in United States 
Dollars (USD).  The revenue ranges from $1500 (the cost of two stolen zodiac boats) to $5.5 
million which was paid for the safe return of the tanker MV Maran Centaurus in 2009.  The 
ransom payments will not be adjusted for inflation due to the short time period that the research 
covers.  The ransom variable is used in order to test the pirates’ expected utility gained from a 
single pirate attack.  By testing various deterrence strategies against the expected revenue of 
pirates, it may be observed that certain strategies are effective in diminishing the gains from 
piracy.  If the gains from piracy are lessened, an increase in the allocation of funds to that 
strategy could increase the effectiveness in fighting pirates.  Also, if the expected returns from 
piracy are lessened, pirates may no longer find piracy to be the best source of labor, due to the 
risks. 
 The variables for the defensive and deterrence strategies are used to analyze the various 
anti-piracy activities and are a proxy for measuring the probability of conviction of pirates.  The 
evasive maneuvers variable is a dummy variable that measures whether or not the captain of the 
commercial vessel utilizes evasive maneuvers.  The evasive maneuvers variable is calculated as a 
dummy variable in all regressions because the extra price of conducting evasive maneuvers 
could not be determined.  According the Marine Security International (MSI) services, evasive 
maneuvers are increases in speed and zig-zag patterns that make it more difficult for pirates to 
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board the ship.  The EVMNS variable represents the cheapest strategy.  Costs include general 
anti-piracy training of naval captains.  This variable operates as a disincentive for pirates due to 
the increased difficulty to hijack vessels.  Therefore, it requires greater skill as a pirate in order to 
hijack vessels, and as seen in Chu, Lu, and Chen (2005), pirates will be forced to join pirate 
organizations.  This is due to the need for improved technology and equipment.  Also, pirates 
with some naval competence are required and low skilled pirates will drop out of the criminal 
labor supply due to the difficulty of hijackings as a result of evasive maneuvers and their likely 
high rate of failure.  This also supports the theory that disenfranchised Somali fishermen, as a 
result of IUUs, make-up the majority of the pirate labor supply.  The coefficient for the evasive 
maneuvers variable will most likely be negative due to the increased difficulty of hijacking a 
ship imposed on the pirates.  If the coefficient for evasive maneuvers is large, it would suggest 
that a comprehensive training program for captains traveling through dangerous waters would 
mitigate the damages experienced due to pirate attacks. 
 Military intervention includes any situation in which any naval military vessel directly 
intervenes in an active pirate attack.  Military presence is also a result of intervention; however, 
the military intervention variable only covers incidents where they are present during an attack.  
The military intervention variable is a dummy variable which assigns a one or zero to each 
situation depending on whether the military played an active role in an attack or not respectively.  
The cost of any military action is approximately $83,000, and in order to calculate the cost 
efficiency, the proxy amount is multiplied by the coefficient. This calculation provides the 
estimated cost efficiency of military intervention.  Intervention can be either the presence of a 
coalition navy ship or helicopter.  Also, military intervention extends to naval convoys and any 
attempted hijacking with naval military vessels in the general vicinity.  In many anecdotal cases, 
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pirates respond to the arrival of military ships by abandoning weapons or fleeing the scene of the 
attack.  There are also cases in which pirates respond to the arrival of military vessels by 
shooting upon the naval warships.  The intervention of international militaries affects the 
probability of conviction of pirates.  By increasing military spending, pirates are much more 
likely to be apprehended or even killed in violent exchanges.  Increases in apprehension decrease 
the marginal revenue of each attack.  Also, the potential threat of death or injury threatens the 
utility of pirates by increasing the severity of punishment.  The presence of potential fatal 
responses by military may deter pirates from joining the pirate labor force.  The military 
intervention variable should have a large negative coefficient.  However, military expenditures 
are very expensive; therefore, the variable must have a high coefficient in order to justify the 
large allocation of funds to military spending.  
 Another form of potentially dangerous forces faced by pirates are private security teams.  
The variable assigns a one or a zero to ships attacked that have security teams or do not 
respectively.  The cost efficiency can be calculated by multiplying $55,000 to the coefficient, 
which represents the cost to hire a private security team for a single convoy (Voytenko 2011).  It 
is cheaper for the international community for each ship to employ private contractors trained in 
maritime defense; however, it increases the cost for commercial vessels.  Furthermore, the 
presence of an armed security teams increases the likelihood of deadly force being used by 
pirates.  This potentially endangers the crew, which a situation that is preferably avoided.  Like 
the military intervention variable, private security teams impose the potential force and increase 
the marginal cost for each pirate attack.  The cost of private security teams are measured by the 
wages earned by the private contractors.  The coefficient is expected to both be large and 
negative in both equations.  This is due to the belief that the presence of security teams will have 
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a negative effect on the amount of ransom pirates expect to earn as well as significantly decrease 
the probability of a successful hijacking.  It is unlikely that untrained pirates are able to overtake 
ships with trained professionals.   
 Anti-piracy measures include any other activity that does not include any of the previous 
deterrent strategies, based on (BMP 4 2011).  Reports of ships utilizing anti-pirate measures 
demonstrate that use of rocket flares, lining the ship’s perimeter with barbed wire, alert watches, 
SSAS alarm systems, fire hoses, citadels/safe rooms, and detachment of ladders have all 
experienced some success in limiting hijackings.  The anti-piracy measures variable is a dummy 
variable that simply determines whether or not a crew used anti-piracy measures when they came 
under attack from Somali pirates.  The cost efficiency multiplier for anti-piracy measures is 
$54,000 (Bowden 2011).  Unlike security teams and military intervention variables, best 
management practices implementation is a single cost.  After the initial capital input, anti-piracy 
measures cost nothing for every subsequent convoy.  Costs associated with anti-piracy measures 
include training of the crew and any extra equipment costs including barbed wire, flares, as well 
as any other additional equipment.  These costs are much lower than security teams, but not as 
low as training for evasive maneuvers.  Like both of the previous variables, the general anti-
piracy measures conducted by the ship’s crew are expected to raise the difficulty for pirates 
attempting a hijacking.  This decreases expected revenue and makes it a less profitable venture.  
The coefficient is expected to have a negative effect on the success of hijackings, but it is not 
expected to have as great an effect as military intervention or security teams. 
 The last deterrent strategy is the use of a safe room/ citadel.  A citadel is considered to 
have been used if pirates are able to board the ship, but the crew locks themselves in a safe room.  
This does not ensure that the pirates are not able to take control of the ship; however, within the 
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sample, there are no incidents in which the crew reports to have taken control of the ship after 
taking shelter in a citadel.  The CITADEL variable is designated by a binary variable. The cost 
efficiency variable is $450,000 (Break Bulk 2012).  The cost represents the installation cost of a 
bullet proof safe room.  The citadels found in the sample are assumed to be bulletproof due to the 
inability of the hijackers to take control of the ship. 
 Also being tested in the regressions are two variables that may have an effect on the 
amount of ransom paid, number of hostages and length of captivity.  These two variables provide 
an additional variable that may help explain variations in ransom payments.  These two variables 
are only used to test the ransom dependent variable because they should have no effect on 
whether pirates are successful in hijacking a ship.  The number of hostages ranges from 2-39, 
and the length of captivity ranges from 1.5-13 months.  Current trends demonstrate that ransom 
negotiations have become increasingly more complicated.  During that same time frame, the 
amount of ransom payments has increased. Therefore, there may be a correlation between length 
of captivity and ransom payments that is due to time.  Regardless, there is expected to be a 
positive effect of number of hostages and length of captivity on the amount of ransom paid.   
 In addition to the RHS variables that measure the effectiveness of the deterrence 
activities, several control variables are included in the regression to account for variations from 
month to month and year to year.  First, a proxy for the total number of ships in pirate-infested 
waters, the total number of ships that travel through the Suez Canal, accounts for the volume of 
commercial ships that travel through the waters that are notorious for pirate attacks.  The variable 
is measured monthly in order to account for changes from month to month.  Controlling for the 
total number of ships prevents the estimated coefficients from being biased.  Biases avoided 
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include interpreting increases in piracy as a result of increases in commercial shipping in through 
the pirate channels and waters (Suez 2012).   
 In order to control for variability in the level of pirate technology, the variable PRTINPT 
provides an estimate for the amount of capital put into each attack.  The amount of input of a 
pirate attack starts at 14,000 USD, which is the cost of a pirate skiff, an engine consistent with 
those used by pirates, and basic semi-automatic weapons (Murphy 2012).  14,000 USD input 
represents the estimated amount for all attacks in 2010. Each year is decreased by 1,000 USD in 
order to account for growth of pirate technology.  In any case that reports the pirate skiff as too 
slow to keep up with the ship or having engine problems, an estimated input of 7,500 is assigned 
which represents inferior technology.    
 The gross registered tonnage variable is used as a proxy for ship size.  It is expected that 
the GRT variable will affect both sets of regressions.  First, larger ships are less susceptible to 
being hijacked by pirates.  For example, three out of five yachts were successfully hijacked, 
whereas one of eight tankers was successfully hijacked.  Second, larger ships will require a 
larger ransom payment to secure their release.  It is expected that GRT will have a negative effect 
on the HJK variable and a positive effect on the ransom variable. 
 The regression also controls for seasonal changes.  Eastern Africa, including adjacent 
waters, are subject to violent monsoon seasons.  These extreme weather conditions dictate the 
difficulty of shipping, including increased difficulty for pirates attacking commercial ships.  
Therefore, by accounting for changes in season, and noting the most probable seasons in which 
pirates choose to conduct operations, potentially skewed monthly data can be avoided.  The 
monsoon season lasts from the end of May until the beginning of September.  The variable 
 
 
64 
 
assigns a value of either one or zero for when the attack is during the monsoon season or during 
the calmer months respectively.   
4.2: Regression Results and Analysis 
 In Table 7, seen below, the probit model expresses the effects of the various deterrent 
activities on the dependent variable, HIJACK.  There are only two variables that demonstrate any 
significance.  That is to say, only the coefficients of anti-piracy measures and evasive maneuvers 
can be considered less than zero with any confidence.  Given the significance of the coefficient, 
it can be said that the two variables have a significant deterrent effect on pirates’ ability to hijack 
a vessel.  However, it is difficult to analyze the coefficients in this initial regression due to the 
binary reports of deterrence efforts.  Furthermore, the R-squared for the test is relatively weak, 
.3207.  The controls added in the second regression only increase the R-Squared to .3525.  This 
suggests that there are influential variables not included in the first two regressions.  With a 
small amount of the variability of the dependent variable explained by the independent variables 
and the lack of significant coefficients, another test needed to be conducted in order to evaluate 
the activities more in depth.  From this initial test, it appears that anti-piracy measures and 
evasive maneuvers have a complicating effect on pirates’ ability to hijack a ship. 
In the second regression, the model predicts that there are more successful hijackings 
with the greater number of ships in the pirate area of operations.  Despite the fact that SUEZ is 
not significant at the .1 level, it predicts that, given the average number of ships per month that 
pass through the Suez Canal (1,557), the probability of a ship being hijacked is 200%.   
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   TABLE 7: 
Dependent Variable: Hijack (1) 
 
(2) 
   
   C .5289 -1.479 
 (1.725) (-.555) 
ANTPMRS -.895 -.911 
 (-2.32)** (-2.23)** 
EVMNS -1.705 -1.77 
 (-4.69)*** (-4.43)*** 
SECTEAM -.377 -.713 
 (-.422) (-.762) 
MILITARY .593 .575 
 (1.52) (1.403) 
PRTINPT  1.71E-05 
  (.153) 
GRT  -6.7E-06 
  (-1.032) 
MONSOON  -.789 
  (-1.398) 
SUEZ  .0013 
  (1.075) 
   
   McFadden R-squared .3207 .3525 
S.E. of regression .378 .379 
S.D. dependent var .451 .451 
Number of Obs. 100 100 
   
Note: Z-statistics are in parentheses                  
*-Denotes significance at the 10% level                 
**- Denotes significance at the 5% level                 
***-Denotes significance at the 1% level 
 
However, if the two significant deterrence variables are used by the attacked ship, the probability 
of being hijacked is reduced to -66%.   The predicted probabilities of hijack success are greatly 
reduced when the simplest anti-piracy deterrence strategies are used.  This makes a strong case 
for increased training and preparation of individual ships in order to prevent pirate victimization.  
It is ultimately the responsibility of ship owning companies to protect their employees and 
property.  Therefore, the implementation of anti-piracy measures and evasive maneuvers 
significantly reduces the probability of being hijacked by Somali pirates.  Although the other 
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deterrence strategies are not significant in both regressions in Table 7, this is most likely due to 
the shortcomings of the model to properly predict the actual effect of the deterrence strategies on 
the success rates of pirates.  Furthermore, it is very unlikely that military intervention increases 
the probability of successful pirate hijackings.  Lastly, it is important to note that there are other 
factors that affect how successful pirates are in attacking ships.  The size of the ship and 
inclement weather conditions also reduce the probability of a successful hijacking, as 
demonstrated by the GRT and MONSOON variables. 
In Table 8, seen below, the dependent variable is changed to the reported amount of 
ransom paid to pirates in return for the release of hostages as well as property, including the ship.  
By using the ransom payments as the dependent variable, the regressions explain how the four 
deterrence activities affect the expected utility of the pirates from a single attack. Also added to 
the regressions are two hostage variables that measure the amount of time hostages are held in 
captivity and how many hostages are taken in a successful hijacking.  The addition of these 
variables is expected to capture the decision making rationale behind ship owning and insurance 
companies when they are negotiating ransom payments. 
Three analyses are reported in Table 8.  The first examines how effective the deterrence 
variables are at decreasing the expected utility of pirates.  The second regression adds additional 
controls.  Lastly, the third regression measures the effectiveness of the four deterrence variables 
while controlling for changes in ransom due to variation in time, hostages, ship size, and length 
of captivity.   
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TABLE 8: 
Dependent Variable: 
Ransom (3) (4) (5)  
     
     C 1,049,234 -423,736.8 -777,074.4  
 (6.46)*** (-.314) (-.9607)  
ANTPMRS -42,378 -48,605.01 20,436.79  
 (-.4802) (-.547) (.3805)  
EVMNS -831,589.5 -200,607.9 -136,914  
 (-4.26)*** (-4.43)*** (-.1.01)  
CITADEL -366,934.2 -410,637.9 -108,190  
 (-.844) (-.942) (-.407)  
SECTEAM -902,758.7 -909,781.6 33,454.38  
 (-1.342) (-1.347) (.0811)  
MILINT -249,073.2 -191,909.8 -64,959  
 (-1.076) (-.804) (-.45)  
HOSTAGES   67,242.53  
   (8.32)***  
GRT  4.419 5.093  
  (1.51) (2.88)***  
MONSOON  -266,147.4 -23,083  
  (-1.03) (-.147)  
PRTINPT  74.38 35.89  
  (.496) (1.08)  
SUEZ  -310.89 182.05  
  (-4968) (.483)  
LGTCAPTV   78,834.5  
   (2.988)***  
     
     R-squared .1893         .2289 .728 
Adjusted R-squared .1462        .1518 .694 
S.E. of regression 927,450       924,424.5 555,225.6 
Number of Obs. 100           100 100 
Note: t-Statistics are in parentheses                  
*-Denotes significance at the 10% level                 
**- Denotes significance at the 5% level                 
***-Denotes significance at the 1% level 
  
As seen in regression (3), the deterrence variables are not able to fully predict the size of 
a ransom payment alone.  The R-squared is weak, .1893.  In the second test additional control 
variables are added, including MONSOON, GRT, SUEZ, and PRTINPT.  From the second 
regression, the effect of two of four of the deterrence variables is significant.  Both best 
management practices and evasive maneuvers significantly decrease the amount of ransom 
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expected by pirate hijackers.  In the case of evasive maneuvers, the coefficient demonstrates that 
by executing evasive maneuvers is extremely effective.  In any case where a captain uses evasive 
maneuvers, pirates expected ransom is decreased by $200,609.  That is significant when the 
average ransom payment is around 2 million to 3 million USD.  Evasive maneuvers are relatively 
costless.  Therefore, if a captain is trained in proficiently maneuvering his ship, pirates are 
drastically limited in their ability to board the ship.  Although the second regression 
demonstrates that only evasive maneuvers are significantly effective against pirate attacks, the 
variability of the dependent variable is still largely unexplained, and the R-squared value is 
.2289.   
 The last test introduces length of captivity and number of hostages into the regression.  
The test reveals that the size of ransom payments is largely determined by factors after the 
attack.  The dependent variable is largely explained by the number of hostages, size of the ship, 
and the length of captivity.  Companies are willing to pay more for the safe return of valuable 
cargo and large crews, as demonstrated by the significance of the hostage variables.  These 
variables also explain much of the variability of ransom payments.  The R-squared value of .728 
demonstrates that the amount of ransom payments is mostly determined by the hostage 
negotiation variables and not by events that occur before the hijacking. 
The significance of ship size, hostage size, and length of captivity is due to the 
relationship between how much shipping companies are willing to pay for the safe return of the 
crew and the ship.  First, large ships are usually carrying more expensive cargo; therefore, the 
value of the ship to the company is high.  Also, fishing vessels and yachts are usually privately 
owned or owned by small companies.  In these cases the demands of pirates may be lessened due 
to inability to pay by small companies.  However, the companies that own large ships are usually 
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well insured and they have the means to retrieve pirated crews and cargo.  Second, large crews 
are correlated with large ships and are subject to the same explanation.  Lastly, over the course of 
the five year span that this study is based, the complexity of ransom negotiations has increased.  
This has lead to significantly higher periods of captivity.  Also, during the same time period, 
ransom payments have increased dramatically.  The significance of the length of captivity may 
be capturing the correlation between negotiation complexity and the increase in ransom 
payments.   
 The third regression estimates that a ransom payment increases $67,242 with each 
additional hostage, $78,834 for each additional month the hostages are held captive and $5.09 for 
each additional GRT.  Therefore, the estimated ransom payment for the MV Asian Glory, which 
was hijacked on 01 January 2010, is 2,382,177 USD.  The real reported ransom was 2,400,000 
USD.  The regression coefficient estimated the ransom of the MV Asian Glory with a .7% error.  
Therefore, it can be confidently stated that ransom payments are a function of the size of a ship, 
number of hostages, and length of captivity.  These represent decisions on behalf of insurance 
and ship owning companies.  The deterrence activities do not affect ransom payments 
significantly. 
 Using regression (3), the estimated effect of the deterrence strategies on the amount of 
expected revenue can be estimated without the overriding effect of ship size, hostages, and 
length of captivity.  The lack of significance is most likely due to the limitations of the model.  
However, estimated effect can still be observed from the coefficients.  The coefficients estimate 
the effect of the use of the various deterrent methods.  Therefore, in order to determine the cost 
efficiency of each method, the coefficient must be divided by cost.  First, best management 
practices are estimated to produce a decrease in expected revenue of pirates by -48,605 USD. 
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The cost efficiency
20
 of purchasing basic preventative equipment, is predicted to be as follows: 
sonic deterrent equipment/ alarm systems (-37.43), barbed wire (-3.899), sandbags (-38.99) 
(Voytenko 2011).  The predicted cost efficiency for each piece of equipment is likely not 
representative of the effectiveness of each piece of equipment.  The anti-piracy measures 
variable was measured as one, therefore, it does not differentiate the effect of each 
implementation.  Furthermore, the use of suggested BMP equipment is a fixed cost.  Therefore, a 
single purchase has a constant deterrent effect regardless of the number of times a ship travels 
through pirate waters.  
 In regression (4), the coefficient of the presence of a citadel/safe room is -410,637 USD.  
At a 450,000 dollar cost, the expected cost efficiency is 1.05.  Citadels are also a fixed cost.  The 
coefficient of the presence of a security team is -909,781 USD.  If the cost to hire a security team 
for a single transit is 55,000 USD, the expected cost efficiency is -16.16.  Security teams cost 
55,000, on average, per transit.  This makes them more costly than other strategies for that 
reason.  Lastly, the coefficient of military intervention is -191,909 USD.  The operating cost of a 
military vessel to aid a distressed commercial vessel is approximately 83,000 USD.  Therefore, 
the estimated cost efficiency is 1.885.  Like security teams, military intervention has a cost for 
each response.  However, unlike the other deterrent activities, military intervention places the 
burden of cost on their respective country, whereas, the cost of the other strategies falls on the 
company that owns the ship.   
 From the data, it is clear that an evasive maneuver is the most effective strategy for 
preventing hijackings with a cost efficiency of -875,503.5.  This is because there is no 
                                                          
20
 Cost efficiency is measured by loss in expected pirate revenue (from ransoms paid) per dollar spent on a deterrent 
activity. 
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measurable cost associated with conducting evasive maneuvers.  Additionally, if cost of evasive 
maneuvers equals zero, then cost efficiency cannot be computed, and it may be subject to 
inconsistency.  However, some older ships and small ships may still be vulnerable due to slow 
speeds and increasing pirate technology.  In these cases, the utilization of BMP, as suggested in 
(BMP 4, 2011) will yield the greatest deterrent effect against pirates.   
 The estimated effects given by the regressions have several limitations.  One, the 
deterrent effect of military presence (not intervention) cannot be measured in the scope of this 
analysis.  Two, the size of the sample may have affected the significance of the coefficients.  
Three, the sample data was obtained through reports of pirate attacks from a large range of 
sources.  In many cases, information was scarce.  This may be due to company’s attempting to 
protect their reputation by limiting the amount of details to reach the public or lack of coverage. 
Therefore, inaccuracy of data is a possibility.  Lastly, omitted from the analysis was the 
variability in the ability of the pirate hijackers.  The study treats the pirates as a single entity.  
However, in reality it is much more likely that there are different groups of pirates with a large 
range of financing and expertise.  This may have a biasing effect on the reasons for why a ship 
was hijacked. 
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CHAPTER V 
    CONCLUSION  
In a 22 February 2012 New York Times report by Jeffrey Gettleman, foreign policy 
leaders from about 40 countries met in the Lancaster Building in London on 16 February 2012.  
The topic of the meeting was a discussion of the international plan to solving the instability in 
Somalia, and its starving nation.  The meeting is acknowledgement by the foreign community 
that a long term solution to the major issues facing Somalia is the only last way of combating 
piracy, among other Somali issues, is the only proper way to ensure that pirates can no longer 
operate with impunity.  The long term solution demands foreign nations to provide funding and 
supervision for the reestablishment of an effective Somali government as well as opportunities 
for Somali people to earn their own living.   
For nearly 20 years Somalia has been a devastated nation with a void of power.  This has 
had a destructive effect on its citizens, many of whom are living in utter poverty.  Another 
consequence of the crumbling political and social infrastructure of the nation has been the free 
reign of gangs, including the development of complex pirate organizations.  The only solution to 
this problem is to create a self-governing and policing government.  This long term plan will take 
a large amount of funding, support from leading nations, and time.  Meanwhile, what are 
maritime companies to do about pirates who face little chance of reprimand for their brutal 
crimes? 
 This research has provided a comprehensive overview of the development of Somali 
piracy since 1991 and discussed the consequences of the actions of pirates.  The research also 
demonstrates that the piracy dilemma shares many of the characteristics of other crime and 
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pirates rationally in response to international policies.  The statistical analysis found in Chapter 
IV estimates that the amount of ransom paid for the release of ships and hostages is a function of 
the value of the ship hijacked (using GRT as a proxy), number of hostages, and number of 
months hostages are held captive.  However, the statistical analysis also estimates that ship 
owning companies and ships’ captains can prevent a hijacking by employing the preventative 
measures outlined in “Best Management Practices 4th Edition” (BMP 4 2011).  In turn, the more 
ships are able to deter pirates from hijacking vessels in the Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean, and Red 
Sea, the expected return to piracy decreases.    
The economic model of crime and punishment developed by Gary Becker, discussed in 
Chapter III, predicts that if coalition forces and commercial vessels are able to decrease the 
amount of expected revenue, increase the marginal cost of attacking ships, and increase the risk 
for pirates to be captured, then the pirate labor supply will decrease and the number of pirate 
attacks will decrease.  From 2009 to 2010, there is only a small increase in the number of pirate 
attacks, which may suggest some success in combating piracy.  However, the real impediment to 
ending Somali piracy is the chaotic environment of Somalia and the inability to consistently 
prosecute Somali pirates.  The impoverished and uncontrolled atmosphere of Somalia have two 
large affects on piracy.  One, due to scarce legal job opportunities, pirates are replaceable; 
therefore, captured pirates are easily replaced by pirate leaders operating within the Somali 
borders.  Two, pirates do not face a consistent threat of punishment due lack of resources for 
prosecution and jailing pirates.  Within the Becker model, the legal job scarcity decreases the 
institutional variable and increases the labor supply for pirates.  Also, the inability to threaten 
piracy with incarceration makes them favor taking the risk of being caught, knowing that they 
will not be sufficiently punished for their actions.  Therefore, the potential revenue of a 
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successful pirate attack outweighs the risks and punishments, which leads to an increase in the 
number of pirate attacks and consequently more hijacked vessels.  The optimal strategy to 
counteract the piracy problem is to combine long run and short run efforts. 
This research has demonstrated that the actions taken by coalition forces and 
implementation of best management practices has increased the cost for pirates and decreased 
their expected revenue.  Estimated costs from the statistical analysis also demonstrate that 
allocating resources to training personnel and providing ships with anti-piracy equipment have a 
high success rate in deterring pirates.  In Table 7, both ANTPMRS and EVMNS had significant 
effects at the .05 and .01 levels respectively.  Both methods of pirate deterrence, undertaken by 
the private owners and captains, had a significant negative effect on decreasing the likelihood of 
pirates successfully hijacking the vessel.  In Table 8, the majority of the variability of ransom 
payments paid was accounted for by LGTCAPTV, GRT, and HOSTAGES.  All three of these 
variables had significant effects at the .01 level.  However, when the three hostage variables were 
omitted, ANTPMRS and EVMNS were significant in reducing the expected revenue of the pirates.   
Given that the coefficients on ANTPMRS and EVMNS were significant and negative in two of the 
four regressions run, it is very likely that they are effective in preventing pirates from being able 
to board and hijack ships.  It is also of note that in cases in which the pirates were able to board 
the vessel, the expected revenue increased dramatically.  The PRTBRDVSL had a significant 
effect at the .01 level.  Although the other tested deterrence methods were not significance in any 
regression, it is most likely due to the inability of the sample to capture the true effect of the anti-
piracy measures on expected revenue and probability of a successful hijacking. 
  The statistical analysis does not yield a large number of significant results due to three 
large limitations on the data.  First, Somali piracy has experienced rapid expansion in the range 
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of attacks and number of offenses.  Therefore, the research only covers five years of anti-piracy 
activities, which may not be enough time to fully examine the true effects of the deterrent 
strategies.  Second, the sample data represents only reported data which is scarce and potentially 
inaccurate.  Many insurance companies and companies that own the ships have an interest in 
preventing the details of a hijacking from being public record.  The design of the analysis 
attempted to mitigate the potential problems caused by inaccurate information, but the lack of 
reliable reports may have altered the significance and magnitude of the coefficients.  Third, one 
of the two policy variables in Becker’s model is degree of punishment; however, due to lack of 
data and the design of the analysis, the research does not investigate the effects of prosecution on 
the number of pirate attacks. 
The research does not examine how the allocation of funds to improving Somalia’s 
infrastructure, prosecution of suspected pirates, and building of jails affects the prevalence of 
pirate attacks.  These activities would constitute a long run approach to preventing 
disenfranchised Somalis from joining the ranks of pirates.  Would allocation of all funding to 
improving infrastructure and the effectiveness of the Somali government eradicate piracy in 
Somalia?  In all likelihood, not.  While it is necessary that a greater focus must be placed on 
improving conditions in Somalia as well as establishing some sort of police force that can limit 
pirate operations on land, naval deterrence must remain a part of the concerted effort to rid 
piracy in these vital shipping lanes.  The analysis provided by this research represents one part of 
the research needed in order to suggest a policy of resource allocation.   
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5.1. Future Research 
 Research in the future should be dedicated to examine the effects of how increasing 
Somali infrastructure could limit the ability of pirate organizations to operate.  In order to do so, 
research will have to be postponed until full restoration efforts being and data is available.  In 
addition to studying the effects on piracy as a result of increased funding to infrastructure, the 
changes in the number of pirates prosecuted may have an effect on the number pirate attacks.  
Although data on the effects of financing Somali development are not available, future research 
could examine the effects of infrastructure development in comparable unstable countries.  If a 
nation under similar conditions was able to decrease its crime rate due to the development of a 
government and private sector labor supply, recreating those measures taken could provide a 
strong model to aid the growth of Somalia, and potentially rid the country of its pirate 
organizations.  
 Further research can also be done in order to improve the predictive capability of the 
model introduced in this study.  A larger sample, more reliable reports, and additional control 
variables may be able to capture more of the variability in the success of pirate attacks.  Lastly, a 
statistical analysis that captures both of the policy variables in Becker’s model may be able to 
provide a policy that advocates an effective allocation of funds to both long run and short run 
activities. 
 Piracy developed in Somalia due to the total lack of regulation and lack of available 
work.  Poverty and hunger continues to plague the Somali population, and in reaction to the 
unfortunate conditions, many young Somalis joined the ranks of pirates.  The only lasting 
solution to ridding the country of pirates is to develop a self-sustaining Somali government 
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capable of policing its own citizens.  Until that goal becomes a reality, shipping companies can 
provide the means to protect their crews and capital.  This study has demonstrated that properly 
training ships’ crews and equipping ships with proper anti-piracy equipment can effectively 
prevent pirates from being able to hijack private and commercial ships.  These methods of 
preventions have relatively low costs, and by lowering the success rates of pirates, the labor 
supply of Somali pirates may begin to decrease because of the increases in risk of punishment, 
associated with military presence and increased Somali infrastructure, and decreases in 
profitability, as a result of decreases in likelihood of successful hijackings.     
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Appendix A: List of Acronyms 
ANISOM: African Union’s Military Mission to Somalia 
BMP: Best Management Practices 
CMF: Combined Maritime Forces 
CTF 151: Combined Task Force 151 
EEZ: Exclusive Economic Zone 
EU NAVFOR: European Union Naval Force 
HDI: Human Development Index 
IGAD: Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
IMB: International Maritime Bureau 
IRTC: Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor 
IUU: Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated fishing 
LHS: Left Hand Side variable 
MARLO: Navy Maritime Liaison Office  
MEU: Marine Expeditionary Unit 
MRF: Maritime Raid Force 
MSCHOA: Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa 
NSC: NATO Shipping Center 
RHS: Right Hand Side variable 
RPG: Rocket-Propelled Grenade 
SNM: Somali National Movement 
SPM: Somali Patriotic Movement 
SRC: Supreme Revolutionary Council 
SSDF: Somali Salvation Democratic Front 
TFG: Transitional Federal Government  
USC: United Somali Congress 
UKMTO: United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations Office 
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VADM: Vice Admiral 
VBSS: Visit, Board, Search, Seizure teams 
WSLF: Western Somali Liberation Font 
WFP: World Food Program 
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Appendix B: List of Tables 
 
Table 1: Estimate Annual Cost of Somali Piracy 
Estimated 
Costs 
(Millions 
USD) 
Ransom 
Costs 
Coalition 
Forces 
Prosecution 
Costs 
Insurance 
Premiums 
Commercial 
Vessel 
Security 
Equipment 
Cost to 
Local 
Economies 
Re-
Routing 
Anti-Piracy 
Organiztions 
Upper 
Bound 
238 2,000 31 3,200 2,500 1,250 2,300 25 
Lower 
Bound 
94 1,000 30 460 363 1,000 267 24 
 
Table 2: Major Governmental Changes in Somali History 
Date Controlling 
Government 
Cause for Change 
600-1600  Arab Sultanate Koreishite immigrants from Yemen 
1600-1800 Sultan of Oman 
and Zanzibar 
Took control of coastal towns 
1840-1885 United Kingdom East India Company gains unrestricted harbor facilities 
1886-1920 United Kingdom U.K. gains control over Northern Somalia through treaties 
with ruling chiefs 
1885-1940 Italy Italy gains commercial advantages (1885); In 1908 Italian 
Somliland is established and colonial status is granted; In 
1936 Italy annexes Ethiopia 
1941-1960 United Kingdom- 
Military 
administration  
Britain defeats Italian forces in eastern Africa during the 
onset of WWII 
1960-1969 Somali Republic Somali Republic is formed through the UN General 
Assembly (1959); Italy relinquishes control over Somaliland  
1969-1991 Gen. Said Barre; 
SRC 
Military coup overthrows constitutional democracy and 
Gen. Said Barre assumes position as President 
1991-Present TFG Absence of effective government; failed state 
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Table 3: Total Number of Successful and Attempted Somali Pirate Attacks 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Gulf of Aden 10 13 92 117 53 
Arabian Sea 2 4  1 2 
Oman   1   
Red Sea    15 25 
Somalia 10 31 19 80 139 
World Total 239 263 293 410 445 
Somali attacks 
as a percentage 
of the world 
total 
9.2 18.2 38.2 52.0 49.2 
 
 
 
Table 4: List of Variables 
       
TABLE 4: 
List of Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) 
 
       
       Dependent Variable       
HIJACK X X     
RANSOM   X X X  
Independent Variable       
ANTPMRS X X X X X  
EVMNS X X X X X  
CITADEL   X X X  
SECTEAM X X X X X  
MILINT X X X X X  
HOSTAGES     X  
GRT  X  X X  
MONSOON  X  X X  
PRTINPT  X  X X  
SUEZ  X  X X  
LGTCAPTV     X  
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Table 5: Definitions for all Variables 
Dependent Variables: 
3. HIJACK: Assigns a one or a zero to each variable depending on whether the attacking 
pirates were able to gain control of the ship or not respectively. 
4. RANSOM: The amount of ransom paid to the pirates for the safe return of the crew and 
property (vessel, cargo, and personal property). 
Independent Variables: 
12. ANTPMRS: Any use of the best management practices, as discussed in section 2.5.B.  
Binary variable; equals one in any attack in which BMPs were utilized by the victim 
vessel. 
13. EVMNS: Binary variable that assigns a one to any incident in which evasive maneuvers 
were taken by the captain of the vessel being attacked in an attempt to impede a pirate 
attack. 
14. CITADEL: Binary variable that assigns a one ships reported to have a citadel or 
saferoom. 
15. SECTEAM: Binary variable that equals one if the attacked vessel has a security team 
aboard. 
16. MILINT: Binary variable that equals one if any type of military intervention is employed 
during a pirate attack.  Military intervention is any situation in which coalition forces are 
present during an attack, are conducting a convoy of commercial ships, or are deployed to 
stop an active pirate attack. 
17. HOSTAGES: Measures the number of hostages that are taken during a pirate attack.  
Crew members are only considered hostages if the pirates successfully hijack the ship. 
18. GRT: Gross registered tonnage.  Measures the size of the ship. 
19. MONSOON: Binary variable that assigns a one to any incident that occurs during a 
month that is in the monsoon season.  The monsoon lasts from the end of May to the 
beginning of September. 
20. PRTBRDVSL: Binary variable that equals one if the attacking pirates are able to board 
the victim vessel.  Pirates may board vessel but still be unsuccessful in hijacking the ship. 
21. PRTINPT: Measures the approximated amount of input capital that the pirates use in a 
single attack.  Approximated by year, anecdotal evidence of resources (skiff engine, 
weapons, GPS, etc.).  
22. SUEZ: Proxy variable for the number of ships that travel through the Gulf of Aden and 
Indian Ocean per month.  The SUEZ variable measures the number of registered ships 
that travel through the Suez Canal each month. 
23. LGTCAPTV: Meausres the number of months that hostages are held captive after a 
hijacking. 
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Max/Min Standard Dev. Number Obvs. 
HIJACK* .28 1/0 0.45267 100 
RANSOM 464,265 5,500,000/0 4948.44 100 
ANTPMRS* .73 1/0 0.44763 100 
EVMNS* .53 1/0 0.5016 100 
CITADEL* .05 1/0 0.27266 100 
SECTEAM* .02 1/0 0.1407 100 
MILINT* .26 1/0 0.4408 100 
HOSTAGES 5.11 39/0 9.7689 100 
GRT 27960.15 164292/100 34311.95 100 
MONSOON* .18 1/0 0.386 100 
PRTBRDVSL* .29 1/0 0.4560 100 
PRTINPT 12690 14,000/10,000 1931.63 100 
SUEZ 1557.11 1,993/1,313 164.76 100 
LGTCAPTV 1.305 13/0 2.935 100 
Note: *= Binary 
Variable 
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Table 7: Estimates for Probit regressions that use probability of successful pirate hijacking as the 
dependent variable 
    
   TABLE 7: 
Dependent Variable: Hijack (1) 
 
(2) 
   
   C .5289 -1.479 
 (1.725) (-.555) 
ANTPMRS -.895 -.911 
 (-2.32)** (-2.23)** 
EVMNS -1.705 -1.77 
 (-4.69)*** (-4.43)*** 
SECTEAM -.377 -.713 
 (-.422) (-.762) 
MILITARY .593 .575 
 (1.52) (1.403) 
PRTINPT  1.71E-05 
  (.153) 
GRT  -6.7E-06 
  (-1.032) 
MONSOON  -.789 
  (-1.398) 
SUEZ  .0013 
  (1.075) 
   
   McFadden R-squared .3207 .3525 
S.E. of regression .378 .379 
S.D. dependent var .451 .451 
Number of Obs. 100 100 
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Table 8: Estimates for the least squares regression model that use ransom paid as the dependent 
variable 
     
TABLE 8: 
Dependent Variable: 
Ransom (3) (4) (5)  
     
     C 1,049,234 -423,736.8 -777,074.4  
 (6.46)*** (-.314) (-.9607)  
ANTPMRS -42,378 -48,605.01 20,436.79  
 (-.4802) (-.547) (.3805)  
EVMNS -831,589.5 -200,607.9 -136,914  
 (-4.26)*** (-4.43)*** (-.1.01)  
CITADEL -366,934.2 -410,637.9 -108,190  
 (-.844) (-.942) (-.407)  
SECTEAM -902,758.7 -909,781.6 33,454.38  
 (-1.342) (-1.347) (.0811)  
MILINT -249,073.2 -191,909.8 -64,959  
 (-1.076) (-.804) (-.45)  
HOSTAGES   67,242.53  
   (8.32)***  
GRT  4.419 5.093  
  (1.51) (2.88)***  
MONSOON  -266,147.4 -23,083  
  (-1.03) (-.147)  
PRTINPT  74.38 35.89  
  (.496) (1.08)  
SUEZ  -310.89 182.05  
  (-4968) (.483)  
LGTCAPTV   78,834.5  
   (2.988)***  
     
     R-squared .1893         .2289 .728 
Adjusted R-squared .1462        .1518 .694 
S.E. of regression 927,450       924,424.5 555,225.6 
Number of Obs. 100           100 100 
 
